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Abstract
We model the interaction of financial constraints, capacity constraints, and the response
of production and inventory to cost and demand shocks. The model predicts that in re-
sponse to favourable shocks, financially constrained firms are unable to build up inventory
as rapidly as unconstrained firms. However, because the favourable shocks gradually ease
the financial constraints, constrained firms continue to build inventory and eventually carry
surplus inventory (relative to unconstrained firms) to unfavourable states. This allows them
to deplete inventory more aggressively in response to unfavourable shocks. Our empirical
evidence provides broad support for the model’s predictions.
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1 Introduction
Inventory investment is widely regarded as an important contributor to business cycle fluctuations.
Even though it constitutes less than 1 percent of GDP in advanced countries, aggregate inventory
investment is 20 times more volatile than GNP and can account for as much as 87% of the drop
in GNP during the average postwar recession in the United States (Blinder and Maccini (1991)).
A less well-known fact is that among publicly traded firms in the U.S. between 1971-2010, the
inventory investments of financially more constrained firms are 73% more volatile than those of
financially less constrained firms. Financially constrained firms also hold 50% more inventory than
the less constrained ones. Given that private firms are generally more financially constrained than
public firms, financial constraint could potentially play an important role in generating the large
volatility of aggregate inventory investments. However, how financial constraints affect inventory
holdings has not been extensively studied in the literature, in contrast to the large literature on
the effect of such constraints on capital investment.
Two of the earliest studies of the financial determinants of inventory holdings (Kashyap, Stein
and Wilcox (1993) and Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994)) attempted to resolve the puzzling
lack of evidence that the cost of finance (or the cost of carry for inventory) affects inventory
behavior. Both papers found evidence that in recent U.S. recessions, a so-called “bank-lending
channel” seemed to have affected the ability of bank-dependent and liquidity constrained firms to
invest in inventory. Subsequently, Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1994) (hereinafter CFP), using
quarterly data from Compustat, demonstrated that during three sub-periods from 1981-1992 when
monetary policy had a different stance in the U.S. and an inventory cycle was generated, corporate
cash flows affected inventory behavior, and more so for financially constrained firms (smaller firms)
than for unconstrained firms (larger firms). CFP interpreted this evidence as consistent with the
idea that, when faced with a liquidity shortage, financially constrained firms are more likely to
cut inventory investment than other types of investment (for example, investment in fixed assets
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or in R&D) which are associated with larger adjustment costs (that is, are less flexible).
In this paper, we explore the effects of financial constraints on firms’ inventory behavior.1 We
first present a model of inventory behavior in which production capacity, sales, and inventory
holding decisions are simultaneously made by financially unconstrained as well as constrained
firms. We calibrate the model to replicate observed differences in first and second moments of sales
and inventory holdings (scaled by lagged capital) as well as changes in inventory, sales and capital
(also scaled by lagged capital) between financially unconstrained and financially constrained firms.
In particular, our model calibrations generate similar differences in the ratio of inventory holdings
to lagged capital for constrained and unconstrained firms as in the actual data (median values of
16 and 24 percent, respectively, for financially unconstrained and constrained firms for the model
generated data versus 22 and 30 percent in the Compustat data at quarterly frequency), and also
similar differences between the two groups in the variability of inventory over lagged capital and
inventory growth as in the actual data. Based on our model, we then derive several empirical
implications of financially constrained behavior, test these implications on model-generated data,
and then take the same tests to the real data. We find consistent results. An important feature
of our tests is that, unlike most other tests of financially constrained behavior, we do not need to
rely on cash flow sensitivities to interpret our results.
Our model builds on the notion that capital investment is not only associated with higher
adjustment costs relative to inventory adjustment, but for financially constrained firms, capital
is also difficult to rebuild. We thus augment the standard “linear-quadratic” model2 with both
capacity and financial constraints and allow a role for both cost and demand shocks. Cost shocks
1Two recent papers model inventory as a factor of production together with capital. Jones and Tuzel (2013)
study the effects of cost of capital on inventory investment and find that risk premium is negatively related to future
inventory growth. They use risk premium to proxy for financial conditions and find results that are consistent with
previous literature. Belo and Lin (2012) model inventory the same way as Jones and Tuzel (2013), but study the
relation between stock returns and inventory growth rate. They find that firms with lower inventory growth rate
outperform firms with higher inventory growth rate. Inventory adjustment costs are important in these models in
explaining the return spreads between high and low inventory growth firms, following standard q-theory logic.
2See, for example, Ramey and West (1999), Section 3. CFP (1994) provide an excellent overview of the
literature, including prior work on the effect of monetary policy on inventory holdings.
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have gained favor in the inventory literature as the phenomenon of producing more than sales
when cost shocks are favorable and less than sales when cost shocks are unfavorable – known as
production cost-smoothing behavior – is consistent with the widely documented fact that inventory
movements are procyclical.3 In contrast, demand shocks (in the absence of cost shocks) lead to
countercyclical inventory movements when production costs are convex (over-produce relative to
demand and build inventory when demand is low, and underproduce and sell from inventory when
demand is high) and imply countercyclical inventory movements. However, as noted by Blinder
(1986), if the stochastic process for demand shocks follows an ARMA(1,1) structure rather than
the standard AR(1) structure, the procyclical behavior of inventory can be restored even when
cost shocks are not extremely volatile.4 Accordingly, we assume that cost shocks follow an AR(1)
process, and demand shocks follow an ARMA(1,1) process.
In our model, due to capacity constraints and capital adjustment costs, financially uncon-
strained and constrained firms have different responses to cost and demand shocks. When fa-
vorable shocks occur, financially unconstrained firms can immediately finance capacity expansion
to take advantage of these shocks. When they experience a favorable cost shock, they step up
production and build up inventory so that they can sell from inventory in unfavorable cost shock
states. When they receive favorable demand shocks, they step up production and inventory ac-
cumulation in anticipation of higher demand in the subsequent periods. Financially constrained
firms, on the other hand, not only have somewhat different incentives, their ability to respond to
3For manufacturing firms, cost shocks can originate in shocks to input prices, e.g. prices of energy inputs,
productivity shocks to input suppliers, or exchange rate fluctuations. An extensive literature documents the
importance of input price shocks for aggregate economic fluctuations (see, for example, Bruno and Sachs (1982)).
Eichenbaum (1989) finds evidence consistent with production-cost smoothing and the importance of cost shocks for
inventory behavior. Blanchard (1983), Durlauf and Maccini (1995), Ramey (1989) and West (1986) all emphasize
the importance of cost shocks for inventory behavior. A recent paper by Wang and Wen (2011) develops a
General Equilibrium model based on production-cost smoothing behavior that is consistent with many stylized
facts regarding aggregate inventory fluctuations.
4The intuition for this is that the effect of the innovation in the ARMA process can get stronger in the short
run if the sum of the autoregressive coefficient and the moving-average coefficient is larger than one. In that case,
demand is expected to be higher next period if it is high this period – this causes firms to build up inventory in
anticipation of future sales when they experience positive demand shocks.
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these shocks is also limited. Both of these lead to markedly different inventory investment behav-
ior for these firms. First, due to capacity constraints made tighter due to their inability to raise
financing and increase production capacity quickly, financially constrained firms are only able to
build up inventory gradually in response to both favorable cost and demand shocks. However, as
their profits increase following these favorable shocks and they are able to invest more in capacity,
the financially constrained firms actually go through a phase of more sustained inventory growth
than their unconstrained counterparts, and carry more inventory to the bad shock states. This
is because inventory, for the financially constrained firms, is also a buffer against future adverse
shocks. Unlike the unconstrained firms who can borrow from the capital market to cover their
operating losses when hit with adverse shocks, the financially constrained firms must sell assets
to tide over such periods. Since capital is costly to adjust and rebuild, the financially constrained
firms have stronger incentives to accumulate inventory when production costs are low, and to sell
from inventory in adverse states rather than engage in asset sales.
These differences in the inventory investment behavior of unconstrained and constrained firms
manifest in the way these two types of firms respond to favorable and unfavorable cost and de-
mand shocks. First, in response to both favorable cost and demand shocks, while both types
of firms immediately step up inventory accumulation, the immediate response of financially con-
strained firms is more muted than that of their unconstrained counterparts. However, financially
constrained firms’ inventory accumulation in response to these shocks is more prolonged, and
they carry more inventory to adverse shock states than the unconstrained firms. In these adverse
shock states, while both types of firms reduce inventory accumulation and possibly deplete in-
ventory, financially constrained firms do so more aggressively and in a more sustained manner
than the unconstrained firms. In other words, we expect the relative sensitivity of the response
of constrained firms vis-a-vis the unconstrained firms to be asymmetric in the short-term, with
constrained firms responding more sluggishly to favorable shocks but more aggressively to unfavor-
able shocks. However, this asymmetry would no longer exist over a longer period, and constrained
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firms would eventually accumulate (deplete) more inventory than unconstrained firms in response
to favorable (unfavorable) shocks.
We first demonstrate the asymmetric response for our calibrated model-generated data via
regressions of inventory growth on the cost and demand shocks. We also show that the asymmetry
disappears in the longer term, with constrained firms accumulating more inventory in response to
favorable shocks, and depleting more inventory in response to adverse shocks. We then take the
model to actual firm level data on inventory behavior. Since proxies for demand shocks are not
readily available, we focus on cost shocks.5
Indices of input prices at the industry level at the annual frequency can be obtained from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Using percentage change of the input price index as a proxy
for firm level cost shocks, for inventory growth at the annual frequency as the dependent variable,
we find that constrained firms adjust inventory more slowly to favorable cost shocks, but do so more
aggressively for unfavorable shocks. These results hold for each of four commonly used measures
that classify firms as financially constrained/unconstrained, namely, firm size, availability of bond
or commercial paper ratings, the Hadlock-Pearce Index, and the Whited-Wu Index.
To examine the dynamics of inventory adjustment implied by our model, we require input price
changes at higher frequency. Unfortunately, the quarterly price indices from BEA are available
only at the sector level (15 industry groups) from 2005. Therefore, we focus on commodity prices,
which directly and indirectly affect the cost of production of firms in many different industries,
and for which we have a relative long time series. We focus on three commodities: oil, gold, and
silver. Our model shows that sales growth responds positively to the favorable shocks, and that
inventory growth responds to sales growth in the same way as it does to the shocks for constrained
and unconstrained firms. Commodity prices affect, directly or indirectly, the cost of production
5Since we do not have a prior on which shock, demand or cost, is more important to sales growth, we calibrate
the parameters of the shock processes so that demand and cost shocks contribute equally to sales growth. Under
this calibration, the simulated data shows that while the effects of cost and demand shocks on inventory changes
are qualitatively similar, the former is the main driver of changes in inventory investments.
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of firms in many industries. Accordingly, we first identify those industries in which quarterly
sales growth is sensitive to the negative of the quarterly change in the price of the commodity in
question, and focus attention on these industries. We find that for all three of the commodities,
sales growth responds to the change in price with a lag of two quarters. To further ensure that we
are correctly identifying the impact of cost shocks generated by changes in commodity prices, we
instrument quarterly sales growth with quarterly change in each of the commodity prices lagged
by two quarters, and test whether inventory growth responds to instrumented sales growth in a
manner predicted by our model. We find consistent evidence.
We get similar results using a time series of quarterly input price changes at the industry-level
that we construct based on the inter-industry Input-Output table and output prices based on
the Producer Price Index (PPI) provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We calculate the
percentage of inputs from each supplier industry to the total inputs of the customer industry,
and use this to weigh the output price indices of the supplier industries to construct the index
for the supplier industry’s input price. We use an approach very similar to that described above
for commodity prices and instrument firm sales growth by the percentage change in input price
change lagged by two periods. Our results for the response of inventory growth to instrumented
sales growth are similar and consistent with the predictions of the model.
Since firm characteristics such as firm size that determine whether a firm is classified as finan-
cially constrained/unconstrained could directly affect inventory behavior (and not only via the
financial constraint channel), we also examine inventory behavior around an event that provided
exogenous variation to the degree of financial constraint faced by a group of firms. Lemmon and
Roberts (2010) show that three near-concurrent events in 1989 (the Collapse of Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc., the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989 (FIRREA), and a change in the National Association of Insurance Companies (NAIC)
credit rating guidelines) led to a major contraction of the availability of external financing for
below-investment-grade firms. To understand how an exogenous change in financing constraint
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affects inventory investment vis-a-vis firms that are not exposed to such a change, in a difference-
in-difference setting, we compare the inventory investment behavior for a set of below-investment-
grade firms before and after the credit shock with that of matched unrated firms. We do this test
for two sets of firms: (i) those that are exposed to a favorable (below industry time-series median)
annual input price change for the three years before the credit shock as well as the three years af-
ter, and (ii) those that are exposed to an unfavorable annual input price change. We find that the
quarterly inventory growth for the firms exposed to the credit shock is lower when they experience
favorable input price change in the last three quarters of 1990 – consistent with a more sluggish
response by financially constrained firms as implied by our model. However, if the window is
extended to the fourth quarter of 1993, the difference becomes much smaller, also consistent with
the model. For firms exposed to unfavorable shocks, we find that the credit shock-exposed firms
deplete inventory holdings at a faster pace than the matched unexposed firms, and the difference
widens over the longer horizon. We perform a similar experiment, again following Lemmon and
Roberts (2010), based on the idea that the severity of the shock was more important for firms
headquartered in the Northeast, since bank lending contracted much more sharply in that region
during 1990 and 1991 due to declining real estate prices and consequent erosion of bank capital.
We get quantitatively very similar results.
In summary, we make four major contributions. The first is to explicitly model capital accumu-
lation, and the interaction between production capacity and inventory accumulation, previously
unmodelled in the literature. The second is to model and examine the effect of financial con-
straints on this interaction. Similar to the informal arguments in CFP, our model captures the
idea that when faced with poor profitability, financially constrained firms without access to exter-
nal financial markets may prefer to liquidate inventory rather than capital. While CFP test their
hypothesis in terms of cash flow coefficients, we derive and test a different implication which does
not require us to rely on the interpretation of cash flow coefficients, an issue that has been the
subject of much debate in recent literature. Herein lies our third contribution. Finally, we attempt
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to isolate several factors that affect inventory holding behavior both in the presence and absence
of financial constraints, and in the process, suggest possible reasons for the much higher inventory
holdings of constrained firms. This is an issue that, unlike cash holdings, has been completely
untouched in recent literature, and could potentially be tested with suitable firm-level constructs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and explores the implications.
Sections 3 explains the sample. Section 4 shows our main empirical findings from actual and
simulated sample. Section 5 presents the results when we use input price changes at quarterly
frequency to instrument sales growth. Section 6 examines inventory behavior around an event
that provided exogenous variation to the degree of financial constraint faced by a group of firms.
Section 7 discuss the robustness of our results when firms could hedge their shock and accumulate
cash holdings. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
The firm’s production technology is described by the following equations:

















where Qt is the output level, which is bounded above by the capacity/capital Kt−1 at the beginning
of period t and the aggregate productivity level A0At with A0 being a constant scaling factor.








/Kt−1 . Production incurs time-varying linear costs and quadratic costs CQt,
where Zt is the cost shock and d1 and d2 are constants. The appearance of At in equations (2)
and (3) is to ensure balanced growth, which will be explained later. In equation (3), Yt and St
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refer to sales in dollars and in units of quantity, respectively, Xt is the demand shock, and h is
the constant slope of the demand curve.
There are two exogenous shocks in our model, idiosyncratic cost and demand shocks. We
also assume a constant growth trend in productivity At, i.e., At = g
t , to match the time trend
in sales and inventory.6 Cost shocks play an important role in explaining the phenomenon of
producing more than sales when cost shocks are favorable and less than sales when cost shocks are
unfavorable, known as production cost-smoothing behavior (Eichenbaum, 1989). This behavior
is also consistent with the widely documented fact that inventory movements are procyclical.
Demand shocks can also lead to production-smoothing behavior when production costs are convex
(over-produce relative to demand and build inventory when demand is low, and underproduce and
sell from inventory when demand is high). However, demand shocks following the commonly used
AR(1) process would imply countercyclical inventory movements. Blinder (1986) shows that if
demand shocks follow an ARMA(1,1) structure, the procyclical behavior of inventory can be
restored. The reason is that the effect of the innovation in the ARMA process can get stronger
in the short run if the sum of the moving-average coefficient and the autoregressive coefficient is
larger than one. In that case, demand is expected to be higher next period if it is high this period.
In anticipation of higher future sales, firms build up inventory when they experience positive
demand shocks, resulting in procyclicality. Following Blinder (1986), we thus assume that cost
shocks follow an AR(1) process, and demand shocks follow an ARMA(1,1) process.
The cost shocks follow an AR(1) process specified as: Zt+1 = ρZZt + σZε
Z
t+1, where ρZ is the
autocorrelation coefficient and εZt+1 is an i.i.d. standard normal variable uncorrelated across firms.







εXt+1 , where ε
X
t+1 is an i.i.d. random variable with standard deviation of σX , which is uncorrelated
across firms and with εZt+1, ρX is the persistence, ρε is the moving average coefficient, and X¯ is
6Because our paper focuses on the cross-sectional differences in inventory behavior, aggregate productivity
shocks are not critical. For simplicity, we assume no aggregate productivity shocks and thus a constant discount
rate. We also solve a version of the model with aggregate shocks and our main results hardly change. The results
are available upon request.
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the long-run average of the demand shock and is a scaling factor in the model.













where γ measures the elasticity of the stockout avoidance costs to sales and Nt is the inventory
level whose change follows the identity
Qt = St +Nt −Nt−1 . (5)
The constant b measures the magnitude of the stockout costs and c refers to the sales-to-inventory
ratio that results in zero stockout costs. Again, we include At in the cost function to impose bal-
anced growth. The quadratic stockout avoidance cost function reflects the manifestation of two
types of costs: the first is the physical cost of carrying inventory, which is an increasing function
of the level of inventory; the second is the expected cost of stocking out, which is a decreasing
function of the level of inventory given sales, as a higher inventory-to-sales ratio decreases the
probability of stocking out. The overall cost decreases initially in the level of inventory as the
likelihood of stockout decreases, and then eventually increases in the level of inventory when the
cost of holding inventory dominates.
The law of capital accumulation follows Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It, where δ is the depreciation rate





2Kt−1, where a is a positive constant. The firm, as a going concern, pays fixed
and variable operating costs, where the latter depends on the production capacity, and operating







, where f0 and f1 are constants and the appearance
of At−1 is to ensure balanced growth. Because of the variable costs of capacity, the firm has an
incentive to decrease capacity during bad times.
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For simplicity, we assume that the firm is an all-equity firm. Shareholders maximize firm value,
which is given by the following optimization problem:
Vt(Kt−1, Nt−1, Xt, Zt) = max{Qt,Nt,It}
{Dt + βEt [Vt+1]} . (6)
where Dt ≡ Yt − COt − CQt − CNt − CIt − It is the dividend payment, the discount rate β is
assumed to be constant for simplicity, and the maximization is subject to the constraint defined
by equation (5).
We solve the model for two types of firms: (1) financially unconstrained firms who can seek
external financing with no costs; (2) financially constrained firms whose dividend has to be non-
negative. Both constrained and unconstrained firms face the same optimization problem described
by equation (6), except that the optimization problem of constrained firm is solved subject to an
additional constraint Dt ≥ 0. Our setup is a simple way to model firm heterogeneity in external
financing costs, which could be due to reasons such as information asymmetry and asset tangi-
bility. Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2003) and Belo, Lin and Yang (2016), among others, provide
microfoundation for heterogeneity in financing costs. In Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2003), debt
capacity depends on the net wealth of entrepreneurs due to costly state verification. In Belo,
Lin and Yang (2016), debt capacity is limited by the asset value due to collateral constraints.
In those models, firm size becomes a natural proxy for financial constraint. In our model, we
do not take a stand on where firm heterogeneity in financial costs originates from. Differences
in firm characteristics such as size among firms with different financing costs arise endogenously.
More important, when we analyze the behavior of the firms we model, we do not need to reply on
observed firm characteristics to classify constrained and unconstrained firms, which allows us to
isolate the effect of financing costs from other factors such as profitability.
Since our model has four state variables, including two firm-specific shocks, capital level, and
inventory level at the beginning of the period, and three endogenous choice variables, including
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capital investment, inventory investment, and output (which could be less than the capacity), the
commonly used solution method, value function iteration, suffers from the curse of dimensionality.
Following Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014), we solve firms’ optimal production, inventory holding,
and investment policies using the perturbation method. The details of the solution method are
included in Appendix A.
2.1 Remarks on the Model
The assumption of convex production costs, though reasonable for manufacturing industries, is
in fact not required for our main results. Blinder (1986) shows that with increasing marginal
costs, production smoothing rather than production-cost smoothing occurs, so that firms accu-
mulate inventory when demand is low and deplete inventory when demand is high, leading to
counter-cyclical inventory behavior. However, a sufficient variance in cost shocks combined with
an ARMA(1,1) stochastic process for demand shock (or one in which demand builds up at first and
then decays) is sufficient to generate pro-cyclical behavior.7 Thus, our results would continue to
hold with constant or decreasing marginal costs. Such an assumption would also be meaningful for
some other sectors of the economy, such as the Retail sector.8 However, we retain the assumption
of increasing marginal cost because manufacturing firms still constitute the bulk of our sample
(60%) and it is important that our calibration exercise addresses the most important segment of
the economy.
7When demand shocks follow an ARMA(1,1) process, the effects of a positive innovation εXt on the demand
in the subsequent periods are (ρX + ρε), ρX(ρX + ρε), ρ
2
X(ρX + ρε), etc. That is, the response of demand to an
innovation first builds up and then decays. Expecting a better demand next period after a positive innovation,
firms tend to build up inventory to sell in the future.
8In fact, Blinder (1981) provides evidence that (1) changes in inventory of retail sectors are as important as
those of manufacturing sectors in terms of magnitude and the contribution to business cycle (see, Table 4); (2) two
facts hold for both manufacturing and retail sectors: (a) variance of production is larger than the variance of sales
(Tables 12,13); (b) correlation of sales and changes in inventory is positive or zero (Table 13). Further, for retailers,
changes in the purchase price of goods is a key driver of inventory behavior. Thus it seems that the behavior of
inventory investment in manufacturing and retail sectors are not very different, at least in the aspects that we are
interested in.
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Further, the input K called “capital” in the model can be interpreted fairly broadly to represent
any factor of production that (a) limits production capacity in the short term, (b) entails costly
expenditure to build up, and (c) is costly to adjust. As such, it is not limited to represent the stock
of plant and machinery only, but also encompasses skilled labor (for firms in the high-tech sector),
number of stores or retail outlets, or warehouse capacity (for firms in the Retail or Wholesale
sector). Thus, we exclude only Financial firms and Utilities in our empirical analysis.
Our model is perhaps most directly relevant for finished goods inventories. However, it is
not difficult to see that the qualitative properties for inventory behavior are likely to extend to
intermediate goods inventories as well. When intermediate inputs are cheap (corresponding to
favorable cost shocks), firms in the model produce more and accumulate more finished goods
inventory, However, if there are production lags, or economies of scale in delivery of intermediate
inputs9, intermediate goods inventory will increase as well. Some intermediate goods inventory (or
work-in-progress inventory) will be directly created by the firm in the process of transformation
of purchased inputs to output. Since financially constrained firms need to allocate their internal
profits to capacity investment and purchase of intermediate inputs, they will initially lag behind
their unconstrained counterparts in terms of investment in intermediate inputs, but will go through
a longer spell as capacity expands. In the same way, in adverse states, they use up accumulated
intermediate inventory rather than purchase new intermediate inputs, and do so more aggressively
than unconstrained firms. Also worth recalling in this context is the “invisible hand” argument
(Blanchard, 1983), which suggests that if cost shocks are common across producers and users of
intermediate goods, then firms will invest in intermediate goods inventory precisely when costs
are low and their producers are producing more, and they will be depleted when costs go up
and producers produce less. Thus, investment in intermediate goods inventories should also be
procyclical, and constrained firms may have a stronger incentive to cut investment in intermediate
goods inventory in bad times (and therefore buffer up in good times, since they need to produce
9See Blinder (1981) for discussions of the importance of economies of scale in delivery.
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in bad times to generate sales revenue, for which intermediate inputs are necessary). Modelling
the invisible hand mechanism would require an aggregative approach which is beyond the scope
of this paper.
2.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency. Table 1 presents the parameter values used in the
calibration. Our calibration strategy is as follows. The capital-to-output ratio α is set to 0.7 to be
consistent with the estimate in Hennessy and Whited (2007). The growth rate of productivity g is
1.009, chosen to match the average aggregate growth rate of sales in our sample. Since we assume
risk-neutrality in the model, the discount rate is the risk-free rate, given by 1
βg
. The discount
factor β is hence set to 0.982 to generate a quarterly interest rate of 0.91%. In equilibrium, the
average investment-to-capital ratio is given by 1 − (1 − δ)/g in the model. Capital depreciation
rate δ is then chosen to match the quarterly investment-to-capital ratio of 0.024 in our sample
period. Investment adjustment cost parameter a is chosen to match the volatility of investment-
to-capital ratio. The slope of the demand curve h is chosen to generate an average markup of
20%, consistent with the calibration in Altig et al. (2011). The scaling factor A0 in the capacity
constraint is chosen to match the average capacity utilization rate of 80% for the sample period
1971 - 2010.10 The stockout avoidance cost ratio c is set to 2.08 to match the mean of inventory-
to-capital ratio. The long-run mean of demand X¯ is a scaling factor and is chosen so that the
average capital level is one.
To pin down the values of the volatilities of idiosyncratic demand and cost shocks σX and
σZ , we match the time-series average of the cross-sectional standard deviation of sales-to-capital
ratio (0.134 vs. 0.157 in simulated and real data). Since we do not have a prior on the relative
magnitude of the volatilities of demand and cost shocks, we assume that both shocks contribute
10The capacity utilization data is from the IHS Global Insight dataset.
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equally to the variations in sales growth.11
The remaining 9 parameters, the stockout avoidance cost parameter b, elasticity of stockout-
avoidance cost to sales γ, production cost parameters d1 and d2, the persistences of idiosyncratic
cost and demand shocks ρZ and ρX , the moving average coefficient ρε, and the operating cost
parameters f0 and f1, are chosen to match the means and volatilities of sales-to-capital ratio,
sales change-to-capital ratio, and inventory change-to-capital ratio, the volatility of inventory-
to-capital ratio, the autocorrelations of sales-to-capital ratio, and the ratio of the volatility of
aggregate output to the volatility of aggregate sales.12 In total, we have 20 parameters to match
20 moments in the data.
We simulate 100 panels, each with 1440 quarters and 600 firms, half of which are financially
constrained and the other half are financially unconstrained. For each panel, the simulation starts
from the steady state values of the state variables. We drop the first 720 quarters to ensure that
the simulated economy has reached the equilibrium. The same regressions applied on the real
data are conducted for each simulated panel separately. The reported regression coefficients and

















where i refers to the ith simulated panel.
11Specifically, we choose σX and σZ so that the following two regressions have similar R-squared: S Growtht =
α+β1CostShockt+β2CostShockt×FC+εt and S Growtht = α+β1DemandShockt+β2DemandShockt×FC+εt.
12Blinder (1986) shows that the ratio of the volatility of aggregate output to the volatility of aggregate sales for
all manufacturing industry is 1.14, while this ratio is 1.13 in our simulated data.
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2.3 Key Model Ingredients and Hypotheses Development
2.3.1 The Determinants of Inventory Holdings
Little is known about the cross-sectional determinants of inventory holdings, and even less as
to why financially constrained firms hold 50 percent more inventory as a proportion of lagged
capital than do unconstrained firms, and exhibit higher volatility of inventory holdings. To gain
intuition about the model and these questions, we conduct comparative static exercises on the
model-generated inventory holding levels and its volatility by changing four key parameters of the
model.13 We report the effects of parameter changes – one at a time – on both the mean level
of inventory holding (inventory over lagged capital) for each type of firm, as well as the standard
deviation of the same variable (within square brackets).
Given a negatively sloped demand curve and stochastic and upward sloping marginal cost
curve, firms have a natural incentive to produce more when the marginal cost curve is lower, and
carry inventory for sale to periods when it is higher. This incentive for inventory accumulation
exists for both unconstrained and constrained firms and leads to procyclical inventory investments.
However, such sales-smoothing (or production cost smoothing) behavior is more important for the
latter because in the bad cost states, when profits are low, they face the risk of having to sell capital
or adjust capital investment too drastically, which is costly. If they manage to carry inventory
produced in good cost (high profit) states to bad cost (low profit) states, they can avoid costly
capital adjustment by generating sales via depletion of inventory instead. This incentive to buffer
inventory exists for positive demand shocks as well. These shocks are associated with higher
profits, which allows financially constrained firms to expand production capacity. As capacity
builds up. these firms are able to expand production beyond their intended immediate sales and
carry an inventory buffer into less profitable states.
Thus, any parameter that affects the likelihood of operating losses in the unfavorable cost or
13In the working paper version of the paper, we report comparative statics results for a larger set of model
parameters, including slopes of marginal cost and marginal revenue curves.
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demand states will affect inventory and investment behavior of constrained firms more than that
of unconstrained firms. We first focus on fixed operating costs, f0.
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Table 2 reports our comparative static results. We report, for each parameter change, the
mean levels and the mean of the time-series standard deviations for inventory (N), capital (K),
and the inventory to capital ratio (N
K
) for unconstrained and constrained firms. The time-series
standard deviations are reported inside square brackets. To facilitate comparison, all values for
the mean and standard deviation in Table 2 for inventory and capital are expressed as percentages
of the corresponding values for financially unconstrained firms at the baseline parameter values.
In column (1) of Table 2, we find that if we raise f0 from its baseline value of 0.0665 to 0.076,
there is no effect on the capital investment or inventory holdings of the financially unconstrained
firms. This is because the unconstrained firms do not accumulate inventory with the objective
of avoiding capital depletion in bad states. However, the constrained firms do. So when this
parameter becomes higher, the constrained firms reduce capital and increase inventory. Therefore,
the inventory-to-capital ratio increases for the financially constrained firms from 0.225 to 0.269.
Next, we consider the capital adjustment cost parameter a0. Investment is less flexible than
inventory because it is associated with adjustment cost. When these adjustment costs increase
(larger a0), firms are discouraged from investing in capital. This is seen in column (2). Inventory
holdings also decrease, because capital and production decrease. The inventory-to-capital ratio,
however, is higher for both types. Moreover, it increases much more for constrained firms, consis-
tent with the idea that when investment adjustment costs are higher, cutting capital in bad states
is even more costly for these firms, so that it is more important to carry inventory to bad states.
Next, we consider the effect of higher cost uncertainty. Without cost uncertainty, there is
no reason for production cost smoothing. In column (3), we examine the effects of higher cost
volatility. Higher cost volatility causes unconstrained firms to invest more in capital15. However,
14The baseline value of f0 implies that fixed operating costs are 21 percent of production costs.
15Since capital is costly to adjust, and firms gain more from increasing output when cost is low than they lose
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the constrained firms do not increase capital – because operating cost f1 increases in capital, they
are conservative about increasing capital stock in good cost states as it would be costly to hold
excess capacity or adjust capital down in bad cost states. Thus, the gap in capital stock between
the unconstrained and constrained firms widens. However, constrained firms increase inventory
much more than the unconstrained firms, since with greater volatility, the risk of more severe bad
cost states increases, requiring more inventory to be carried over into these states as a buffer.
Consequently, the inventory-to-capital ratio of constrained firms increases, whereas that of the
unconstrained firms decreases, when cost shock volatility is higher.
Finally, in column (4), we examine the effect of higher demand volatility. The effects are very
similar to those for higher cost volatility. In particular, the unconstrained firms increase capital
investment, and their ratio of inventory to capital falls. In contrast, there is little effect on capital
investment by constrained firms. The latter firms now face a higher likelihood of operating losses
and so respond by carrying a higher inventory buffer. As a result, their inventory to capital ratio
increases.
To summarize, the following factors widen the gap in the ratio of inventory holdings to capital
between financially constrained and unconstrained firms: (a) higher operating costs, (b) higher
capital adjustment costs, and (c) higher volatility of cost and demand shocks. Moreover, there
are two key observations about the volatility. First, the volatility of inventory of financially
constrained firms is much more sensitive in general to the parameter changes than that for the
unconstrained firms. Second, parameter changes that increase investment reduce the volatility of
inventory. This second observation also explains the first one: because they operate under tighter
capacity constraints, financially constrained firms take longer to build an inventory buffer, which
leads to greater volatility in inventory holdings.
from cutting output when cost is high, they increase investment on average when cost volatility increases.
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2.3.2 The Asymmetric Response of Inventory to Shocks
Drawing from the above discussion, the key drivers of the difference in the inventory behavior of
financially constrained and unconstrained firms are the following: (i) production cost smoothing
behavior, which causes both types of firms to produce more when cost states are favorable and
carry inventory to states when cost states are unfavorable, (ii) inventory build up in anticipation
of sustained surge in demand following favorable demand shocks (iii) capital adjustment costs
which provide additional incentive to financially constrained firms to build up inventory (or de-
plete less inventory in favorable states and carry that to unfavorable states, and (iv) capacity
constraints that limit the ability of financially constrained firms to quickly build up inventory in
response to favorable shocks. These four factors generate a set of unique predictions from our
model. Unlike unconstrained firms who have more physical capital and can immediately access
external financial markets to build capacity, financially constrained firms can build up capital and
inventory less rapidly, and only do so as profitability improves in response to a persistent favorable
shock. However, because constrained firms have larger needs to carry inventory to unfavorable
states, they eventually accumulate more inventory as the good state persists. On the other hand,
when the shock is adverse, as discussed above, constrained firms have a stronger incentive to
liquidate inventory than do unconstrained firms immediately, and this effect also persists for a
few periods. Thus, while the difference in sensitivity of inventory growth to cost shocks between
financially constrained firms and unconstrained firms in the short-term will be asymmetric, with
constrained firms responding more sluggishly to favorable shocks but more aggressively to unfa-
vorable shocks, this asymmetry would no longer exist over a longer period, and constrained firms
would eventually accumulate (deplete) more inventory than unconstrained firms in response to
favorable (unfavorable) shocks.
Based on the above, we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis Compared to financially unconstrained firms, financially constrained firms (1)
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deplete inventory more rapidly in reaction to unfavorable shocks; (2) accumulate inventory less
rapidly in reaction to favorable shocks; however (3) as the good state persists, they accumulate
more inventory eventually.
Next, we verify our hypothesis in both the simulated and actual data.
3 Sample
3.1 Actual Data and Variables
Our actual data sample consists of firms listed in the Compustat Industrial Quarterly Files at any
point between 1971 and 2010. Following standard practice, we exclude financial, insurance, and
real estate firms (SIC code 6000-6900), and utilities (SIC code 4900-4999). We exclude from the
sample any firm-quarter observation that has missing book value of asset, sales or inventory. We
also restrict the sample to firms with at least five consecutive years of data. All dollar values are
converted into 2000 constant dollars. Firm characteristics, such as sales (scaled by lagged capital)
and inventory (scaled by lagged capital) are winsorized at 1% level at both tails of the distribution
to alleviate the impact of outliers. In addition, we drop firms with total asset less than 15.5 million
(in 2000 constant dollars) following CFP. The final dataset is an unbalanced panel consisting of
285,075 firm-quarter observations.
Inventory (Nt) in our study is given by Compustat data item INVTQ, which includes raw
materials, finished goods, work-in-progress and other inventory.16 In addition, to correct the bias
that inventory stock value is understated under LIFO and overstated under FIFO, following CFP,
we apply an algorithm developed by Michael Salinger and Lawrence Summers to adjust for LIFO
(last in, first out) and FIFO (first in, first out) accounting. 17
16Unfortunately, disaggregated inventory series are only available in Compustat with sufficient coverage from
the year 2004. When we repeat our baseline results on the disaggregated series, we get qualitatively similar results.
17For more detailed description of the adjustment method, please refer to Salinger and Summers (1983) and the
appendix of CFP. Our results are robust if we do not adjust for FIFO and LIFO.
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Capital (Kt) is defined as total asset (ATQ) minus inventory. This is because capital stock
in the model does not include inventory.18 Sales (St) in the actual data is the level of net sales
(SALEQ). Cash Flow (CFt) is calculated as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items (IBQ)
and depreciation (DPQ) scaled by lag capital. Investment (It) is the quarterly capital expenditure
calculated by converting the Compustat Year-To-Date item CAPXY to quarterly frequency.
Ratios including N/K, S/K, I/K and CF/K are all scaled by lagged capital. N Growth and
S Growth are defined as change in the levels of inventory or sales (in 2000 constant dollars) from
year t to year t− 1, scaled by capital in year t− 1.
We use the reported fiscal quarter end to assign fiscal quarters with calendar quarters. Fol-
lowing CFP(1994) and Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1998), in cases where the end of a fiscal
quarter does not coincide with the end of a calendar quarter, we adjust the data so that the
majority of the fiscal quarter is assigned to the appropriate calendar quarter.
3.2 Financially Constrained Firms
The literature on financial constraints offers many different measures to identify financially con-
strained firms in the actual data. Some of our results are based on ex ante classification of firms
as financially constrained or unconstrained. Firm size is one of the most commonly used and
relatively non-controversial. In each quarter, we rank firms according to the book value of asset at
the beginning of the period and assign the top 30% to the financially unconstrained group (UFC),
while the bottom 30% to the financially constrained group (FC). We also report results for three
other commonly used financial constraint classifications, based on whether the firm has ratings,
the Hadlock-Pierce Index (Hadlock and Pierce (2010)), and the Whited-Wu Index (Whited and
Wu (2006)). In addition, since firm characteristics such as firm size that determine whether a firm
is classified as financially constrained/unconstrained could directly affect inventory behavior (and
18All our results are robust if we use total asset or property, plant and equipment as capital.
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not only via the financial constraint channel), we examine inventory behavior around an event
that provided exogenous variation to the degree of financial constraint faced by a group of firms.
Detailed variable constructions are discussed in Appendix B.
3.3 Comparing Actual and Simulation Samples
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the actual and simulation samples for the variables which
are either targeted for our calibration, or are key regression variables.19 For all variables, the
simulation preserves the order of the first moment, i.e., in every case, if the mean is higher (lower)
for unconstrained firms in comparison to constrained firms in the actual data, this is also the case
in the simulated data. With two exceptions, this is also the case for the second moments.20
The table shows that we are able to obtain a reasonable match between the first and second
moments of the target variables in the real data and the simulated data. It is important to
emphasize that financially constrained and unconstrained firms differ in our model only in one
dimension, namely, the degree of financial constraint. It is possible to argue, however, that these
firms would differ in many other dimensions, which potentially could improve our calibration
exercise. Hennessy and Whited (2007), for example, estimate parameters for small firms and large
firms separately, and find that these firms differ in many dimensions. However, we choose not to
go in that direction because we want to identify, as clearly as possible, the difference that financial
constraints make to the inventory decisions of firms.
Table 4 presents correlations between variables in the simulated data. The main issue of
interest here is to see how well the state variables (the random realizations of demand and cost)
19For the simulation sample, N measures inventory change as the change in the number of units times the
market price. Our results do not change if, in an attempt to mimic the LIFO method, we measure inventory at
cost of production. When the change is positive (current production exceeds sales), we value the change at current
period per unit production cost. If the change is negative (sales exceeds current production), we value the change
at the previous period’s per unit production cost.
20The exceptions occur for sales over capital and sales growth, and even here, the difference between constrained
and unconstrained firms is minor.
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correlate with other firm variables that commonly feature in inventory studies. There are several
noteworthy features.
The correlations reveal that a better state of cost is associated with higher sales over lagged
capital, inventory growth and sales growth, higher investment scaled by lagged capital, cash flow
scaled by lagged capital, and capacity utilization. Firms accumulate inventory when the cost shock
is favorable, consistent with sales smoothing, and stock up for bad times. For the demand state,
the correlations with inventory growth and inventory over capital are negative. This may appear
contrary to intuition, given that the ARMA(1,1) structure has the property that after a positive
shock, demand builds up quickly, and in anticipation, firms increase inventory. The reason for the
negative correlation is that while inventory builds up after the initial positive demand shock, firms
start selling from inventory very quickly while the demand state is still high, generating an overall
negative correlation.21 However, the negative correlation is weaker for financially constrained
firms, consistent with the idea that they take longer time to build inventory, and also have an
incentive to buffer inventory for adverse states. When we examine the correlations with the cost
and demand shocks (which we define to be the negative of the change in the cost realization and
the change in the demand realization, respectively), these are both positively correlated with sales
growth and inventory growth.
The correlations among the remaining variables are consistent with expectations. One interest-
ing set of comparisons between unconstrained and constrained firms involves capacity utilization.
First, consistent with financially constrained behavior, constrained firms need to build capital
much more rapidly when existing production capacity is being fully utilized than do unconstrained
firms – the correlation between capacity utilization and capital growth is 0.66 for constrained firms
but only 0.28 for unconstrained firms. In other words, unconstrained firms generally appear to
21The effect of lagged demand level zt−1 decays at the speed of the persistence ρX < 1 over time, but the effect
of innovation decays at the speed of ρX + ρε first and then ρ
t−1
X (ρX + ρε). Therefore, correlation of lagged demand
level and inventory is negative but the correlation of demand shock and inventory is positive in the short run if
ρX + ρε > 1 and becomes negative afterwards.
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be closer to optimal capacity when they reach fuller utilization of capacity, but constrained firms
need to expand capacity much more quickly. Second, when capacity is more fully utilized, uncon-
strained firms carry more inventory in relation to capital than do constrained firms: the correlation
between capacity utilization and inventory-to-capital ratio is 0.84 for unconstrained firms com-
pared to 0.66 for constrained firms. This suggests a need for the constrained firms of building up
inventory when capacity is more fully utilized (in response to favorable shocks). Consistent with
this, we find that the correlation of capacity utilization and inventory growth for unconstrained
firms is 0.37, compared to 0.58 for constrained firms.22
4 Empirical Results from Actual and Simulated Samples
4.1 The Asymmetric Response on Model-generated Data
Our purpose in this section is to first test whether the hypothesis of asymmetric response is valid
in the model-simulated data. To do so, we regress model-generated inventory growth (change in
inventory scaled by lagged capital) on the change in the level of the cost or demand realization
scaled by its standard deviation (this is what we call a cost or demand “shock”).
In our regression specification, in addition to the cost and demand shocks, we include an
interaction of the shock with an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm is financially
constrained in the model, and 0 if it is unconstrained. We consider favorable (positive, denoted
with a plus sign) and unfavorable (negative, denoted with a minus sign) shocks separately23. To
22The correlations of sales growth with inventory growth, especially for unconstrained firms, are very high.
While in the real data unconstrained firms also exhibit higher correlation of sales and inventory growth than do
constrained firms, the magnitudes are much smaller. Two factors account for this difference. First, unconstrained
firms are identical in our simulation panels, unlike real data where there is significant cross-sectional heterogeneity.
Second, our assumption that unconstrained firms face no financing frictions is admittedly extreme and made for
simplicity – allowing some degree of friction would make these firms more similar to constrained firms and would
reduce the correlations. In regression results reported below, it will be seen that the higher correlations translate to
regression coefficients when inventory growth is regressed on sales growth that are three times larger than those we
get for the actual data. However, the focus of our analysis is to understand the asymmetric response of financially
constrained firms vis-a-vis the unconstrained firms, which is preserved in the real data.
23Recall that a cost shock is the negative of a change in the level of the cost realization.
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control for expected shocks, in these regressions we also control for the lagged state, that is, the
lagged value of the cost or demand realization.
The results reported in Panel A of Table 5 are supportive of the asymmetric response of
inventory to cost and demand shocks in the short term. Both the positive and negative cost shock
variables have significant positive coefficients, indicating that unconstrained firms add (deplete)
inventory in response to of a positive (negative) cost shock. The interaction of the positive cost
shock with the financial constraint dummy is negative, indicating that financially constrained firms
respond more sluggishly to positive shocks; in contrast, the interaction of the negative cost shock
with the dummy is positive, suggesting more aggressive inventory depletion. Note that we control
for the lagged cost state (higher values represent more favorable state), which also has a positive
coefficient. Since the lagged state predicts the expected magnitude of the shock, our results can
be interpreted as firms’ response to the unexpected component of the shock. We get very similar
results for demand shocks, although the economic magnitude of the difference in the response of
constrained and unconstrained firms to the demand shocks are not large.
In Panel B of Table 5, we examine the dynamics of inventory adjustment by the two types of
firms in response to cost and demand shocks. We create indicator variables, ‘Fav ’ and ‘Adv ’, for
extreme shocks in the previous periods. ‘Fav ’ (‘Adv ’) equals to 1 if the average cost or demand
shocks over the past 6 periods is in the top (bottom) 20th percentile of the distribution, and 0
otherwise. We add these indicator variables and their interactions with the financial constraint
dummy to our specification in Panel A. The interaction coefficients for the Fav dummies is sig-
nificantly positive, while that for the Adv dummies is significantly negative, for cost shocks. The
uninteracted Fav and Adv coefficients are also positive and negative, respectively. These results
suggest that while unconstrained firms accumulate (reduce) inventory for several periods after
favorable (unfavorable) cost shocks, financially constrained firms do so more aggressively. Thus,
the asymmetry between the upside and the downside disappears in the longer term. For demand
shocks, the behavior of the unconstrained firms is the opposite of that with cost shocks, as they
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sell from inventory after the initial favorable demand shock as demand surges. However, the finan-
cially constrained firms sell less. Conversely, after an extreme unfavorable demand shock, firms
are left with excess inventory; however, the financially constrained firms reduce inventory more
rapidly, as they run into operating losses.
We use the model as a laboratory to perform falsification tests to examine whether our results
could possibly be driven by differences in other aspects except financing costs. We model two
groups of firms with only one difference at a time: financially unconstrained firms in our baseline
calibration, referred as benchmark firms, and firms with the same calibration but higher operating
cost, higher investment adjustment cost, or lower production cost, respectively. The latter group
of firms, referred as comparison firms, have higher inventory-to-capital ratios on average as shown
in Table 2 so that they mimic financially constrained firms. However, these differences cannot
generate the different inventory behaviors between those two groups of firms as we see between
the financially constrained and unconstrained firms. The results are available on request.
4.2 The Asymmetric Response on Actual Data
We next examine the predictions of the model on real data. Since it is difficult to identify demand
shocks in the real data, we focus on cost shocks.24 Our first approach is to proxy the cost shocks
with the annual intermediate input price changes at the industry level and test whether the
asymmetric response of inventory growth to cost shocks can be obtained from the actual data.
Cost shocks can originate in shocks to prices of intermediate energy, materials, purchased
service input, and labor compensation. Price indices for these components at the industry level
at the annual frequency can be obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.25 We take the
24In our model, cost shock contribute more to inventory growth even though we calibrate the parameters of the
shock processes so that demand and cost shocks contribute equally to sales growth.
25According to BEA, the data are from GDP by Industry accounts released on November 5, 2015, as part of
the annual revision to the industry economic accounts (IEAs). The data for 1947-1996 are from GDP by industries
historical time-series released on February 19, 2016 and have been updated to be consistent with IEAs comprehensive
revision. Statistics were prepared with methodologies that are unique to the GDP by Industry accounts and are
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percentage change in Chain-Type Price Index for intermediate inputs by industry as our measure
for cost shocks. The price indices are available throughout our sample period from 1971 to 2010,
and can be matched to firms by their NAICS.26 To correspond with the frequency of the input price
changes, we test our prediction with the annual Compustat data. For each firm-year observation,
we define the (negative of) the industry input price change that occurred in the year prior to
the firm’s fiscal year-end date as the cost shock,27 and perform the same regression as we did
with the simulated data in Table 5. Our prediction is that while unconstrained firms accumulate
(deplete) inventory in response to favorable (unfavorable) cost shocks, constrained firms react
more sluggishly (aggressively).
We use an almost identical specification as our regression with simulated data in Section 4.1.
Cost shock is again split into favorable and unfavorable shocks, and each is interacted with a
financial constraint dummy. As discussed previously, we use four commonly used financial con-
straint classifications. We define the favorable (unfavorable) shocks as input price reductions that
are above (below) the industry’s median reduction.28 As in our baseline model with the real data,
we control for the financial constraint dummy, the lagged value of inventory over lagged capital,
capital growth, lagged cash flow, and its interaction with the financial constraint dummy. We
also incorporate firm fixed effects and year fixed effects to control for the unobserved time-varying
shocks common to all firms and the unobserved heterogeneity at the firm-level.
The results, reported in Table 6, show that the asymmetric response is evident for each of the
financial constraint measures. Constrained firms respond to favorable shocks more sluggishly and
even deplete inventory (our model suggests that they do so to save internal funds for capacity
for industries defined according to the 2007 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
26The Chain-type price index is prepared using the single-deflation method. An industry’s current-dollar value
added statistics are divided by the industry’s gross output price index. The results approximate that obtained by
double deflation when the prices of an industry’s intermediate inputs increases at about the same rate as its output
prices. For more information, see Yuskavage (2002).
27We multiply the input price change by minus one to be consistent with our notion that positive (negative)
movements are associated with favorable (unfavorable) cost shocks.
28Our results are very similar if we define the favorable (unfavorable) shocks as industry-year with positive
(negative) input price reduction.
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expansion as they expect the favorable shock to persist). However, when the cost shocks turn
adverse, they cut down on inventory holdings and do so much more aggressively than the un-
constrained firms. Somewhat surprisingly, the latter firms accumulate more inventory when the
adverse shocks become worse. Since these shocks are industry-wide shocks, it is possible that the
unconstrained firms accumulate inventory in the expectation that the constrained firms in the
same industry will run out of inventory and would have to cut sales.
5 Input Price Changes at Quarterly Frequency and In-
strumented Sales Growth
Our tests in Section 4 were based on input price changes at annual frequency at the industry level.
To test the dynamics of inventory adjustment in response to cost shocks, we need data on input
price changes at higher frequency. Unfortunately, quarterly price indices from BEA are available
(at the sector level) only from 2005. In view of this data limitation, we rely on model predictions
regarding (i) the relation between cost and demand shocks and sales growth (defined as change in
sales over capital), and (ii) the relation between inventory growth and sales growth for financially
unconstrained and constrained firms. In particular, we show in Section 5.1 below that our model
implies that sales growth is positively associated with favorable cost and demand shocks, and that
inventory growth of financially unconstrained and constrained firms responds to sales growth in
the same way as it does to each of these shocks.
For our empirical tests, we appeal to these results to instrument sales growth of both financially
unconstrained and constrained firms with quarterly change in commodity prices (available at
monthly frequency). We also construct indices of industry-level input price changes based on
Input-Output tables and producer price indices. Instrumenting sales growth allows us to identify
more clearly the set of firms that are exposed, directly or indirectly, to commodity price changes or
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input price changes at the industry level. As we discuss below, firms may hedge their exposure to
cost shocks, so that even within the same industry, they may have different exposure to cost shocks.
We then test the model predictions based on the response of inventory growth to instrumented
sales growth.
5.1 Sales Growth as a Proxy for Cost and Demand Shocks
We first demonstrate the relationship between cost and demand shocks and sales growth in our
model, and the response of inventory growth to sales growth.
In the first two columns of Table 7, we regress sales growth (change in sales scaled by lagged
capital) on standardized cost and demand shocks. Consistent with our expectation, both cost
and demand shocks are significantly and positively related to sales growth. In Columns (1) and
(2) where the shocks and their interactions with the financial constraint dummy are included, the
regression R2 is high – about 18 percent and 19 percent, respectively.29 The interaction of the cost
shock with the financial constraint dummy is insignificant, and the economic magnitude is very
small relative to that of the uninteracted term. The interaction of the demand shock with the
financial constraint dummy is statistically significant, but the economic magnitude is also much
smaller than that of the uninteracted term. These results suggest that in regressions in which
sales growth is proxy for demand and cost shocks, it is unlikely that differences in the coefficients
of sales growth for constrained and unconstrained firms are driven by differences in the sensitivity
of sales growth to the underlying shocks.
Column (3) of reports the regressions of inventory growth on sales growth. The dependent
variable is the change in inventory scaled by lagged capital. Similar to the cost and demand
shock results reported earlier, sales growth is split into positive and negative growth, and each is
interacted with a financial constraint dummy. We control for the financial constraint dummy, and
29The regression R2 is about 36 percent when both shocks and their interactions are included at the same time.
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the lagged value of inventory over lagged capital. We also include a dummy variable, Adv, and its
interaction with the financial constraint dummy. Adv takes a value of 1 if the firm’s lagged sales
growth is below the 20th percentile, and zero otherwise. The motivation is to see whether firms
in our model, especially financially constrained ones, deplete more inventory when the shock is
extremely adverse.30 Moreover, we control for lagged cash flow, which has the highest correlation
with the demand and cost realizations among all other financial variables in Table 4, to control for
expected shocks to sales. The regression of inventory growth on sales growth and its interactions
with the financial constraint dummy are consistent with those we observed when the cost and
demand shocks were directly included.
We also find consistent results for the Adv dummy. Both the dummy and its interaction are
significantly negative, and the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is quite large. Firms
deplete inventory more rapidly when the sales shock is very adverse, and constrained firms do so
more aggressively.
Column (4) in Table 7 report results on the dynamic response of inventory to sales growth. We
focus on extreme shocks. Indicator variable Advt−1,t−6 takes the value of 1 if the firm’s average
sales growth over the last six periods is below the 20th percentile of the firm-specific distribution of
the rolling six-year average sales growth, and zero otherwise; indicator variable Favt−1,t−6 takes the
value of 1 if the firm’s average sales growth over the last six periods is above the 80th percentile,
and zero otherwise. To contrast the dynamic response of the two types of firms, we focus on
the interactions of these two variables with the financial constraint dummy. Consistent with a
symmetric and more aggressive response to both positive and negative extreme sales shocks, the
coefficients of the Favt−1,t−6 and Advt−1,t−6 interacted with the financial constraint dummy are,
respectively, positive and negative. This suggests that over a longer horizon following extreme
shocks, financially constrained firms accumulate more inventory when the shocks are positive, and
30Adv and its interaction with the financial constraint dummy are important as benchmarks for the regressions
with the real data.
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deplete more inventory when those are negative, than their unconstrained counterparts.
5.2 Results Based on Quarterly Input Price Changes
5.2.1 Commodity Prices
We focus on three commodities – oil, gold and silver. To identify which types of firms are directly
or indirectly affected by changes in the prices of these commodities, we first regress, for each
of industry, firms’ quarterly sales growth on the quarterly price change of the commodity in
question, and only keep those industries for which there is a significant positive relationship. We
find significant effect of commodity price changes on sales growth only at a lag of two quarters for
all three commodities.31 Accordingly, we instrument sales growth by the commodity price change
at a lag of two quarters.
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results for oil prices – results for gold and silver are similar
and are available in the Internet Appendix. The regressions were run separately for each quarter
to adjust for seasonality and then averaged over the four quarters, with the t-statistics calculated
using the Fama-Macbeth method. We present our results for all four financial measures. The
first four columns report the short-term response of inventory to predicted sales, and the last four
report the dynamic response. Consistent with our earlier results, financially constrained firms
increase inventory more sluggishly in response to higher positive predicted sales growth than their
unconstrained counterparts. For negative predicted but moderate sales shocks, we do not find any
evidence that firms are cutting back on inventory when sales drop, or that the constrained firms
are cutting inventory more aggressively.32 However, for extreme adverse shocks, both groups of
firms cut back on inventory, and the constrained firms do so much more aggressively than do the
31As discussed below, this is also the case for our measure of quarterly input price changes at the industry level.
It is possible that within a one-year period, firms are affected by past commodity or input price changes at different
lags, with a majority affected at a lag of two quarters. We find that annual sales responds positively to one-year
lagged annual input price change in virtually every industry.
32The coefficient of the interaction of the financial constraint dummy and predicted negative sales growth has
the wrong sign in all four columns, although it is significant in only one column.
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unconstrained firms.
The last four columns present the evidence on the dynamic response of inventory to extreme
favorable and unfavorable shocks. Financially constrained firms accumulate (deplete) more in-
ventory when the predicted sales growth over the previous six quarters is extremely favorable
(unfavorable), compared to financially unconstrained firms. In other words, the asymmetry be-
tween the upside and downside response vis-a-vis the unconstrained firms disappears over the
longer horizon and the financially constrained firms appear to engage in more aggressive buffering
behavior – accumulating more inventory when input costs are especially low (and profits are high)
and depleting accumulated inventory when costs are especially high (and profits are low)
5.2.2 Industry-level Input Prices
Using Input-Output Tables and Producer Price indices available at quarterly frequency, we create
a weighted measure of the relevant input price for all supplier industries based on the output
prices of the industries they purchase products from. This measure is presumably noisier than the
shorter time series available from BEA; however, the two indices are strongly positively correlated
over the time period for which the latter is available. As with oil price changes, the input price
change has a positive and significant coefficient on sales growth in a majority of industries when
we lag the input price change by two quarters. Panel B of Table 8 presents the results when we
instrument sales growth with industry-level change in input price lagged by two quarters. The
results are similar to those in Panel A.
6 Evidence from Quasi-Natural Experiment
Since firm characteristics such as firm size that determine whether a firm is classified as financially
constrained/unconstrained could directly affect inventory behavior (and not only via the financial
constraint channel), we now examine inventory behavior around an event that provided exogenous
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variation to the degree of financial constraint faced by a group of firms. Lemmon and Roberts
(2010) show that three near-concurrent events in 1989 (the Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA), and a change in the National Association of Insurance Companies (NAIC) credit rating
guidelines) led to a major contract of the availability of external finance for below-investment-grade
firms. To understand how an exogenous change in financing constraint affects inventory investment
compared to firms that are not exposed to such a change, in a difference-in-difference setting, we
compare the inventory investment behavior for a set of below-investment-grade firms before and
after the credit shock with that of matched unrated firms. We do this test for two sets of firms:
(i) those that are exposed to a favorable (below industry time-series median) annual input price
change for the three years before the credit shock as well as the three years after, and (ii) those
that are exposed to an unfavorable annual input price change.
In this setting, we are able to examine the inventory adjustments of the firms that are hit
by the credit shock and the matched firms both in the short and the longer run. Our short-run
and long-run windows are the last three quarters of 1990 and the period from 1990Q2 to 1993Q4,
respectively. Note that, since our classification of firms as exposed to favorable and unfavorable
shocks involves three-year averages of the industry-specific input price change before and after the
credit shock, if the inventory behavior of the firms affected by the credit shock and the matched
unaffected firms become more similar in the longer term, this cannot be attributed to the effect
of the cost shocks becoming weaker over time.
Following Lemmon and Roberts (2010), we also use the location of firms’ headquarters as
an instrument for the extent to which firms were affected by the shock. During the 1990-91
period, banks in the northeastern part of the United States had difficulty meeting minimum capital
requirements, and sharply contracted lending.33 Earlier studies (Bernanke and Lown, 1991 and
33The northeastern part consists of the New England region including Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Mas-
sachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and the Mid-Atlantic region including New York, New Jersey, and Penn-
sylvania.
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Peek and Rosengren, 2008, among others) have identified the collapse of the New England and Mid-
Atlantic real estate bubbles as the most important driving force behind the contraction in bank
lending. If bank lending is cut back, bank-dependent firms in the affected region may find it more
costly to obtain credit. In addition, the contemporaneous credit shock to the below-investment-
grade firms, discussed above, made it very difficult for these firms to substitute away from bank
to nonbank credit. Therefore, the credit shock provides us an event that increased the external
financing cost but, as we validate below, is likely exogenous to the investment opportunities of
bank-dependent firms in the Northeast region.
The full sample for the two tests consists of all the unrated firms and firms with a below-
investment-grade debt rating (BB+ or lower) in the quarterly Compustat database during the
period 1986 to 1993 with the same restrictions as in our main sample. The location information,
which is obtained from Bill McDonald’s website, is based on headers for 10-K forms from 1994
to 2010. Since our entire sample period for this exercise is immediately prior to 1994, we use the
1994 location information.
For both our difference-in-difference tests, we define the period from 1986Q1 to 1989Q4 as the
window before the shock, and the period from 1990Q2 to 1993Q4 as the window after the shock.
Moreover, as mentioned above, we consider the first three quarters after the shock (1990Q2 to
1990Q4) to be the short-run window in order to study the immediate response after the shock.
Indicator variable After dummy takes a value of one for the quarters 1990Q2 to 1990Q4 (1990Q2 to
1993Q4) for the short-run (long-run) window, and zero for 1986Q1 to 1989Q4. Following Lemmon
and Roberts (2010), we require that we have at least one observation in both the before and the
after period for each firm, and require that firms do not change between the treatment and control
groups in the sample period.
Our empirical strategy is to test whether an increase in the degree of financial constraint
changed the affected firms’ inventory investment behavior, compared to firms that were not affected
34
by the financial constraint shock, in a manner consistent with the theory developed in the paper.
We expect that the way in which inventory investment of the treated (newly constrained) firms
is affected depends on whether the firms are in good or bad cost shock states. In particular, we
expect that when the cost shock is favorable, in the short window after the capital crunch, the
treated firms exposed to favorable cost shocks will accumulate inventory more slowly than the
control firms, and the difference will become less pronounced in the longer window. When the
cost shock is unfavorable, the treated firms deplete inventory more aggressively in the shorter
window, and the difference between the treated and control firms’ inventory behavior will become
more pronounced over the longer window.
Our empirical results are mostly in line with these predictions. Panel A of Table 9 presents
results for the first difference-in-difference test, in which the treated firms are below-investment
grade firms and the control firms are the industry-and-size-matched unrated firms. Following
Lemmon and Roberts (2010), we only keep those treated firms that do not change ratings between
1986 and 1993.34 The regressions are reported separately for firms experiencing favorable and
unfavorable cost shocks and for both the short-run and long-run. Consistent with the model,
when the cost shock is favorable, the interaction of BelowInvestment and After is significantly
negative in the short window, but becomes smaller in magnitude over the longer window. When
the cost shock is unfavorable, as expected, the interaction is negative (though insignificant) over
the shorter window, and becomes statistically significant over the longer window. Note also
that the dummy variable Preshock which takes a value of 1 for the three quarters before the
shock is insignificant, and the interaction of Preshock and BelowInvestment is also insignificant,
34One consequence of this is that our sample size is modest – especially for those exposed to unfavorable shocks.
A firm belongs to the “favorable cost shock” group if the three year average annual input price change for its
industry is below the time series median for the industry. However, following the same definition for classifying
firms exposed to unfavorable shocks leaves us with a very small number of firms and industries. Accordingly, we
relax the requirement for the post 1990 period by only requiring that the three-year average input price change
not be “extremely favorable” – defined as being above the 80th percentile of the time-series distribution for the
industry. Note that since we hypothesize that the treated firms will cut down on inventory investment in the post-
capital crunch period when subjected to adverse cost shocks, such a relaxation of the requirement biases against
our expected results.
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confirming that differences in pre-tends do not drive our results.
We find more-or-less similar but somewhat stronger results in Panel B, where we report the
results for our second difference-in-difference test. The treated firms are below investment grade
and unrated firms located in the Northeast.35 The control firms are the industry-and-size-matched
firms located elsewhere in the country and does not differ from the treated group before the
shock except for the location of headquarters. If the choice of headquarters is exogenous to the
investment opportunities, by exploiting the variation in the geographic location of firms, we are
able to identify the impact of financial constraints. For favorable cost shocks, the coefficients of
the interaction between the After dummy and the Northeast dummy is significantly negative
in the short window and insignificant over the longer window. On the other hand, when for
unfavorable cost shocks, the interaction is insignificant in the short run, but becomes significantly
negative in the longer run. For the subsample of firms experiencing unfavorable shocks, while the
dummy variable Preshock has a significant negative coefficient36, the interaction of Preshock and
Northeast is insignificant, confirming that differences in trends do not drive our results.
We also verify that the financial shock did not affect growth potential of the treated and control
firms differently, which could be a possible alternative explanation for the divergent inventory
investment behavior. For both tests, the average sales growth of the treated and control firms
conditional on their cost state is not different before and after the shock. Table IA.2 in the
Internet Appendix reports regression results in an identical difference-in-difference framework to
those in Table 9 in which the dependent variable is firm sales growth. The interaction of After
and BelowInvestment (resp., of After and Northeast), is insignificant.
35Here, we do not impose the requirement that the treated firms do not change rating status during 1986-1993,
since the additional restriction on location for the treated firms would further reduce sample size. Consequently,
we retain a larger number of treated firms.
36It is possible that the treated group in Panel B experiencing unfavorable shocks identifies industries that were
more exposed to the sluggish growth in the economy during the previous three quarters.
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7 Allowing Firms to Hedge
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) argue that when the payoff function for firms is concave
in investment, financially constrained firms that rely on internal funds for investment have an
incentive to hedge cash flows. Adam, Dasgupta and Titman (2007) extend this framework to
study hedging choices of financially constrained firms in industry equilibrium. They show that
the flexibility of producing more (less) when costs are low (high) makes a firm’s profit function
convex in investment, and creates an incentive for firms not to hedge cash flows. They show that,
in industry equilibrium, some firms will hedge cash flows, and others will not.
Important for the analysis of Adam, Dasgupta and Titman (2007) is the well-known result
that a price-taking firm’s profit function is convex in the (linear) marginal cost of production.
Ceteris paribus, a price-taking firm prefers facing a random marginal cost to a constant marginal
cost of the same expected value because it then has the option of producing a higher output when
cost is low, and cutting back on output when cost is high. A similar motivation drives production
cost-smoothing behavior in our model – however, our model allows firms to take even greater
advantage of this flexibility by carrying inventory from low-cost states to high-cost states. This is
primarily the incentive that drives the inventory behavior of unconstrained firms. However, since
we deviate from the model of price-taking firms and also have capital adjustment costs, it is not
ex ante clear whether unconstrained firms would be better off if they could hedge their exposure
to cost shocks.
A similar argument applies to constrained firms as well, although here the interactions are
more complex. On the one hand, remaining unhedged allows these firms to increase cash flows
and expand their capacity and production in those states in which it is profitable to produce.37
On the other hand, since they may have to engage in costly asset sales when they incur operating
losses in bad states, they may prefer to avoid exposure to extreme shocks and reduce liquidity risk.
37Note that Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) assume that firm’s investment opportunities are uncorrelated
with cash flows. However, if the correlation was positive, firms would prefer to remain unhedged.
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In our model, they mitigate the latter by using inventory accumulated in the good cost states as
a liquidity buffer. However, again, whether they are better off hedging input cost shocks is an
empirical question.
How do these considerations affect our results? We discuss this next.
7.1 Hedging Input Price Shocks
Hedging reduces the volatility of shocks, and could leave the financially constrained firms more
or less exposed to these shocks than their unconstrained counterparts. We can use our model to
examine how sensitive the differences in inventory behavior between financially constrained and
unconstrained firms are to the differences in the volatility of the shocks faced by these two types
of firms. Since we do not have a prior on which type of firms face more volatile shocks ex post, we
experiment with a wide range of scenarios, under which the volatility of cost shock for financially
constrained firms relative to that for unconstrained firms is 0.5, 0.75, 0.875, 1.125, 1.25, or 1.5,
respectively. We solve the model and run the baseline tests using the simulated data under each
of these scenarios. As shown in Table IA.3 in the Internet Appendix, the average inventory-to-
capital ratio of financially constrained firms is higher than that of unconstrained firms under all six
scenarios. More importantly, the main result of the paper still holds under each of these scenarios:
financially constrained firms increase inventory more sluggishly under favorable cost shock and
deplete inventory more aggressively under unfavorable cost shock. Finally and not surprisingly,
the differences in the sensitivity of the inventory response by unconstrained firms vis-a-vis the
constrained firms to cost shocks during both good and bad states are larger in absolute value when
constrained firms are less able to hedge cost shocks. Thus, the results of this experiment suggest
that the differences in inventory behavior between financially constrained and unconstrained firms
are fairly robust to the differences in the ex post volatility of the shocks faced by these two types
of firms.
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Next, we examine whether and how the response of inventory investment to annual industry-
level input price changes are affected by the possibility of hedging input price shock. We classify
industries as “high hedging” based on the potential usage of purchase obligations to hedge input
price fluctuations. Almeida, Hankins and Williams (2017) (hereinafter AHW) argue that deriva-
tives are mainly used by financially unconstrained firms due to its requirement for collateral. They
show that purchase obligation is a risk management tool available to both financially constrained
and unconstrained firms and is widely used. A firm’s usage of purchase obligations to hedge input
price variations depends on its supplier’s bargaining power and settlement risk. Following AHW,
we measure supplier bargaining power in terms of the supplier industry Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index, and weigh the index of each supplier industry by the importance of the supplier industry
to the customer industry to arrive at a proxy for supplier bargaining power for each customer
industry. AHW also show that supplier Z-score proxies for supplier settlement risk and has a
significant positive impact on the amount of purchase obligations used by firms. We calculate the
median Z-score for each industry, and for each customer industry, calculate the weighted Z-score
of all supplier industries. Based on the above two measures, we consider those industries with
below-mean value of supplier industry HHI (above-mean value of supplier industry Z-score) as
“high hedging” industries.38
Our results (reported in the Table IA.4 in the Internet Appendix) show that for the high-
hedging industries, the sensitivity of inventory investment to favorable shocks disappears for un-
constrained firms, and the sensitivity to unfavorable shocks is weaker when supplier settlement risk
is low. However, our earlier results that constrained firms adjust inventory more sluggishly (more
aggressively) than their unconstrained counterparts when cost shocks are favorable (unfavorable)
remain even in the high hedging industries.
38Based on hand-collected data on derivative hedging of S&P 500 firms, Disatnik, Duchin and Schmidt (2014)
provide a classification of industries on the basis of hedging intensity. Since smaller financially constrained firms
are unlikely to rely on derivative hedging, we do not base our tests on this measure.
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7.2 Cash Holding and Inventory Behavior
If holding cash were costless, the inventory behavior of financially constrained and unconstrained
firms would be identical. Essentially, by buffering enough cash, constrained firms would become
unconstrained. Thus, the entire literature on financially constrained behavior implicitly assumes
that there is a cost to holding cash.39 For our purposes, the issue is whether the cost of carry is
high enough that differences in inventory holding behavior are likely to remain between financially
constrained firms and unconstrained firms. Due to the “curse of dimensionality”, our numerical
solution technique cannot handle solving the optimal cash holding problem together with solving
for optimal inventory, output, and investment. Moreover, estimates of the cost of carry are difficult
to obtain. Therefore, we try to address this issue indirectly.
We take two approaches. First, we examine whether the differences in the downside sensitivities
remains even when the median industry cash holding is high. To this end, in Column (1) (Column
(2)) of Table IA.5 in the Internet Appendix, we create a dummy variable Lcash which takes the
value of 1 when the median cash holding in the industry is below the median of the time series
(cross-sectional) distribution, and zero otherwise. We examine whether, when cash holding is high,
the difference in the sensitivity of the inventory investment to adverse cost shock is still significantly
higher for financially constrained firms compared to unconstrained firms. The interaction of the
adverse shock and the financial constraint dummy (that is, the term that corresponds to the high
cash holding state) remains significant in both columns. In other words, the cost of carry of cash
is high enough that, even when financially constrained firms are carrying a high level of cash
holding to these adverse states, they are not carrying “enough cash” to obviate the need of an
39Holding “cash” in the form of interest-bearing assets such as treasury bills is costly because interest on
cash holdings is taxed (Riddick and Whited (2009)), and shareholders get less than the appropriate risk-adjusted
return. Shareholders are better off if the firm uses the cash to repurchase shares rather than hold it in the form
of an interest-bearing asset the income from which is taxed twice. If the cash is held in the form of currency or
non-interest-bearing deposits, the value of this cash erodes in an inflationary environment, and inventory offers a
better hedge against inflation (this would be the case in our model if the cost shocks are correlated across firms).
Finally, we could assume that shareholders prefer managers to pay out cash and hold an inventory buffer instead
since managers can deviate from the pursuit of shareholder value maximizing policies when private benefit-laden
projects are present. This “free cash flow” problem could be the most significant cost of cash holding.
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inventory buffer: they rely on offloading inventory more aggressively than their unconstrained
counterparts when hit with adverse shocks. The triple-interaction including the Lcash dummy
is also significantly positive. This shows that, consistent with our expectation, constrained firms
deplete inventory less aggressively when firms in the industry have high cash holdings than when
they have low cash holding. Finally, whether cash holding is high or low also has no effect on
the downside sensitivity of the unconstrained firms in Column (1), as expected (although it has a
positive effect significant at the 10% level in Column (2)).
We also conduct a simulation exercise in which cash drawdowns are modelled as negative
dividends scaled by capital. We determine the amount of (maximum permitted) drawdown for
which short-and-long run sensitivities between financially constrained and unconstrained firms
disappear, and compare these thresholds to the actual distribution of cash drawdowns in the real
data (which implicitly reflect the limits imposed by the firms’ cash holding position). Figure IA.1
in the Internet Appendix shows that while the long-run difference in sensitivity to favorable cost
shocks (in other words, the more prolonged buffering behavior by constrained firms in response to
favorable shocks) disappears around the 79 percentile, the other sensitivities survive until extreme
percentiles of the drawdown distribution (93, 98, and 99 percentiles for short run sensitivity
of favorable cost shocks, long run sensitivity of favorable cost shocks, and short run sensitivity
of unfavorable cost shocks, respectively). Overall, these results suggest that the cost of carry
associated with cash holding is likely high enough that the observed differences in behavior are
unlikely to disappear in our model if firms were permitted to hold cash.
8 Conclusion
Changes to firms’ inventory holdings have long been regarded as an important component of
business fluctuations, as has the propagation of monetary policy shocks to the real economy via
firms’ access to finance. While earlier empirical attempts either found little relationship between
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the cost of finance and inventory holding behavior, more recent evidence suggests that monetary
policy may have important effects on the inventory holding behavior of firms that have difficulty
in accessing external finance. There has been little attempt, however, to link the effect of financial
constraints to inventory policy theoretically.
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model that studies the interaction of financial con-
straints and inventory behavior. The main intuition we try to model is that firms’ incentives to
build inventory when costs are low (and demand is high), and deplete inventory when costs are
high (demand is low) are exacerbated when they face financial constraints and have difficulty in
rebuilding capital. The model provides a number of insights on the determinants of inventory
holdings in the presence of financial constraints. Using model-generated data, we develop several
empirical tests of the theory. These tests have the advantage that we do not need to interpret
coefficients of cash flows in our regressions, which has been controversial due to measurement error
issues. When we take these tests to the actual data, we find consistent results.
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Since the productivity level has a constant growth trend At = g
t, we need to show that the model
has a solution on the balanced growth path where all the variables growth at a constant rate. We
first guess that firm value Vt, capital level Kt, sales St, inventory Nt, the costs CQt, COt, and CIt,



































In what follows, we rewrite the first order conditions of the model in terms of the scaled variables.
It then becomes clear that the first order conditions do not depend on time t. That is, the solution
of the scaled variables is stationary and their corresponding variables are indeed growing at the
constant rate of g.
Our solution method is the second-order perturbation method, which requires that the ob-
jective function is differentiable and unconstrained.A.1 For constrained firm, the optimization
problem can be approximated by the following

















where the last term drops to negative infinity rapidly as Dt is close to zero and is called logarithmic
barrier. As $1 increases to∞, the above optimization problem converges to our original optimiza-
tion problem. In our calibration, we increase $1 gradually until the model solution converges. To
add the constraints that output cannot exceed the capacity, we follow the same strategy, i.e.,


































where the last term is the logarithmic barrier for the output constraint and the value of $2 is
chosen similarly as that of $1.
For financially constrained firms, the first order conditions w.r.t. N˜t, Q˜t and I˜t using scaled
A.1The value function iteration method is not subjected to this constraint however it suffers from the curse
of dimensionality. Given that our model has four state variable ({Kt−1, Nt−1, Xt, Zt} and three independent
endogenous variables {Qt, Nt, It}, the value function iteration method is not applicable. Aruoba, Fernandez-
Villaverde and F. (2006) show that the solutions based on the second-order perturbation method can be fairly
accurate compared to those based on the method of value function iteration.
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FC Dummy that equals to 1 if the firm is a financially constrained firm, and zero
otherwise. FCs in the simulated data are firms whose dividend have to be non-
negative and in the real data are classified based on size
FCrating Dummy that equals to 1 if the firm does not have any rating throughout the
sample period, and 0 if the firm has either a bond rating or commercial paper
rating in any given year
FChp Dummy that equals to 1 if the Hadlock-Pierce Index is above the top 30th per-
centile in the quarter, and 0 if it is below the bottom 30th percentile
FCww Dummy that equals to 1 if the Whited-Wu Index is above the top quartile in the
quarter, and 0 if it is below the bottom quartile in the quarter
K Level of beginning-of-period capital defined as capital stock in the simulated data
and as total asset (ATQ) minus inventory (INVTQ) in the actual data
N/K Inventory scaled by K, where inventory in the simulated data is the stock of goods
firms carry priced at market value, and in the actual data is INVTQ adjusted for
the LIFO and FIFO accounting following Salinger and Summers (1983).
N Growth Change in inventory scaled by K.
S/K Sales scaled by K, where sales in the simulated data is the dollar value of sales
and in the actual data is SALEQ
S Growth Change in sales scaled by K, where sales in the simulated data is the dollar value
of sales and in the actual data is SALEQ
S Growth+ Interaction of S Growth and an indicator which equals to 1 if S Growth is posi-
tive, and 0 otherwise
S Growth− Interaction of S Growth and an indicator which equals to 1 if S Growth is neg-
ative, and 0 otherwise
I/K Investment-to-lagged capital ratio, where investment in the simulated data is
the change of capital net of depreciation and in the actual data is calculated by
converting the Compustat Year-to-Date item CAPXY to quarterly frequency
PPE Growth Change in property, plant and equipment (PPENTQ) scaled by K
K Growth Change in K scaled by K
CF/K Cash flow scaled by K, where cash flow in the simulated data is calculated by
subtracting production cost, operating cost, and investment adjustment cost from
sales, and in the actual data is defined as earnings before extraordinary items
(IBQ) plus depreciation (DPQ)
Q/K (simulated data only) Production scaled by K
Utilization (simulated data only) Proportion of capital that firms actually used to generate
output over the total K
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Variable Description
Cost (simulated data only) Negative of the cost realization, higher value indi-
cating a more favorable state
Demand (simulated data only) Realization of demand
CostShock Change in level of (negative) cost realization scaled by its standard devi-
ation in the simulated data, and (the negative of) percentage change in
the Intermediate Input Price Index in the actual data
CostShock+ Interaction of CostShock with an indicator that equals to 1 if CostShock
is favorable (positive in the simulated data, and above industry median
in the actual data), and 0 otherwise
CostShock− Interaction of CostShock with an indicator that equals to 1 if CostShock
is unfavorable (negative in the simulated data, and below industry me-
dian in the actual data), and 0 otherwise
DemandShock Change in level of demand realization scaled by its standard deviation in
the simulated data
DemandShock+ Interaction of DemandShock with an indicator that equals to 1 if
DemandShock is positive, and 0 otherwise
DemandShock− Interaction of DemandShock with an indicator that equals to 1 if
DemandShock is negative, and 0 otherwise
Adv Dummy that equals to 1 if the (cost, demand or sales) shock is below the
20th percentile of its distribution, and zero otherwise.
Fav Dummy that equals to 1 if the (cost, demand or sales) shock is above the
80th percentile of its distribution, and zero otherwise
After Dummy equals to 1 for the quarters 1990Q2 to 1990Q4 (1990Q2 to
1993Q4) for the short (long) run window, and zero for the period from
1986Q1 to 1989Q4.
Preshock Dummy that equals to 1 if the observation is in the three quarters before
the shock (1989Q1 to 1989Q3)
BelowInvestment Dummy that equals to 1 if the firm has a below-investment-grade debt
rating (BB+ or lower) in the quarterly
Northeast Dummy that equals to 1 if the firm is located in the Northeast region
of the United States, which includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania, and 0 otherwise. The location information, obtained from
Bill McDonald’s website, is based on headers for 10-K forms from 1994
to 2010. For the period before 1994, the 1994 location is assigned.
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Table 1: Baseline Calibration
This table lists the parameter values used to solve and simulate the baseline model. The capital-to-output ratio α
is from Hennessy and Whited (2007). The growth rate of productivity g is chosen to match the average aggregate
growth rate of sales in our sample. The discount factor β is set to match the quarterly interest rate. Capital
depreciation rate δ and investment adjustment cost parameter a are chosen to match the mean and volatility of
investment-to-capital ratio, respectively. The slope of the demand curve h is chosen to generate an average markup
in Altig et al. (2011). The scaling factor A0 in the capacity constraint is chosen to match the average capacity
utilization rate from the IHS Global Insight dataset for the sample period 1971 - 2010. The stockout avoidance cost
ratio c is set to match the mean of inventory-to-capital ratio. The long-run mean of demand X¯ is chosen so that
the average capital level is one. The volatility of idiosyncratic demand and shocks σX and σZ are set to match the
time-series average of the cross-sectional standard deviation of sales-to-capital ratio. The remaining 9 parameters,
the stockout avoidance cost parameter b, elasticity of stockout-avoidance cost to sales γ, production cost parameters
d1 and d2, the persistences of idiosyncratic cost and demand shocks ρZ and ρX , the moving average coefficient
ρεand the operating cost parameters f0 and f1, are chosen to match the means and volatilities of sales-to-capital
ratio, sales change-to-capital ratio, and inventory change-to-capital ratio, the volatility of inventory-to-capital ratio,
the autocorrelations of sales-to-capital ratio, and the ratio of the volatility of aggregate output to the volatility of
aggregate sales. Details of how the model is calibrated can be found in Section 2.2. Parameters are reported at
quarterly frequency.
Parameter Value Description
α 0.7 Capital-to-output ratio
g 1.009 Growth rate of productivity
β 0.982 Time-preference coefficient
δ 0.015 Capital depreciation rate
a 60 Quadratic investment adjustment cost
h 0.01 Slope of demand curve
A0 3 Scaling factor in capacity constraint
c 2.08 Stockout-avoidance ratio
b 0.0032 Stockout-avoidance cost
γ 1.5 Elasticity of stockout-avoidance cost to sales
d1 0.132 Linear production cost
d2 0.022 Quadratic production cost
f0 0.0665 Fixed operating cost
f1 0.0069 Linear operating cost
ρZ 0.92 Persistence coefficient of cost shock
σZ 0.137 Conditional volatility of cost shock
X¯ -1.45 Long-run average of demand shock
ρε 0.11 Moving average coefficient
ρX 0.93 Persistence coefficient of demand shock
σX 0.035 Conditional volatility of demand shock
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Table 2: Comparative Statics
This table presents the comparative statics for our baseline model. Parameters of interest include fixed operating
cost f0, quadratic investment adjustment cost a, the conditional volatility of cost shock and demand shock σZ and
σX . More detailed descriptions of the baseline calibration are included in Table 1 and Section 2.2. The top row
shows the parameter value in the baseline calibration. The row beneath shows the corresponding new value. In
column (1) to (4), one parameter value is changed each time while others are fixed at the baseline value. Moments
include mean and standard deviation (in bracket) of the capital level (Kt), inventory level (Nt) and inventory-to-
capital ratio (Nt/Kt). Moments under baseline parameters are reported first, followed by the ones generated from
the new value. For each of these moments, we listed the value for UFC, FC and the difference between the two
groups. The level variables K and N are divided by the corresponding level of UFC in the baseline and multiplied
by 100. All results obtained use the same realization of shocks.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Baseline high f0 high a0 high σZ high σX
Baseline Value f0=0.0665 a0=60 σZ = 0.137 σX=0.035
New Value f0=0.0760 a0=90 σZ = 0.177 σX=0.050
Kt (UFC’s capital in the baseline = 100)
UFC 100 100 79 109 105
[100] [100] [79] [111] [106]
FC 84 81 66 84 86
[85] [83] [66] [87] [88]
Diff(UFC-FC) 16 19 13 25 19
[15] [17] [12] [25] [18]
Nt (UFC’s inventory in the baseline = 100)
UFC 100 100 86 97 101
[100] [100] [84] [103] [102]
FC 132 154 95 168 141
[153] [189] [151] [218] [169]
Diff(UFC-FC) -32 -52 -10 -66 -39
[-53] [-89] [-66] [-115] [-67]
Nt/Kt
UFC 0.150 0.150 0.162 0.134 0.145
[0.050] [0.050] [0.048] [0.058] [0.054]
FC 0.225 0.269 0.273 0.282 0.235
[0.136] [0.181] [0.176] [0.215] [0.152]
Diff(UFC-FC) -0.075 -0.119 -0.111 -0.148 -0.090





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Regression on Shocks with Simulated Data
This table reports the regression results of the asymmetric response (Panel A) and dynamic adjustment (Panel B) on
the simulated data. All variables are defined in Appendix B. The dependent variable is N Growth. CostShock+t ×





t with the FC dummy. In Panel B, we create indicator variables,
‘Fav’ and ‘Adv’, for extreme shocks in the previous periods. CostFavt−1,t−6 (DemandFavt−1,t−6) is a dummy
that equals to 1 if the average cost (demand) shocks over the past 6 periods is in the top 20th percentile of the
distribution, and 0 otherwise. CostAdvt−1,t−6 (DemandAdvt−1,t−6) is a dummy equals to 1 if the average cost
(demand) shocks over the past 6 periods is in the bottom 20th percentile of the distribution, and 0 otherwise.
We also include their interactions with the FC dummy. The simulated data are generate from 100 simulations.
Cross-simulation average of regression coefficients are reported. 95% confidence intervals are included in brackets
and coefficients are marked with *** if 95% confidence intervals do not span zero.
Panel A: The Asymmetric Response on Model-generated Data
(1) (2) (3)
N Growtht N Growtht. N Growtht
FC 0.0081*** 0.0073*** 0.0042***
[0.0080, 0.0082] [0.0072, 0.0075] [0.0040, 0.0044]
CostShock+t 0.0085*** 0.0084***
[0.0084, 0.0085] [0.0084, 0.0085]
CostShock+t × FC -0.0039*** -0.0039***
[-0.0041, -0.0036] [-0.0040, -0.0038]
CostShock−t 0.0098*** 0.0099***
[0.0098, 0.0099] [0.0098, 0.0099]
CostShock−t × FC 0.0052*** 0.0048***
[0.0045, 0.0060] [0.0047, 0.0049]
DemandShock+t 0.0047*** 0.0047***
[0.0047, 0.0047] [0.0047, 0.0047]
DemandShock+t × FC -0.0005*** -0.0007***
[-0.0008, -0.0002] [-0.0010, -0.0005]
DemandShock−t 0.0037*** 0.0037***
[0.0037, 0.0037] [0.0036, 0.0037]
DemandShock−t × FC 0.0005*** 0.0003***
[0.0003, 0.0007] [0.0003, 0.0004]
Costt−1 0.0038*** 0.0036***
[0.0038, 0.0038] [0.0036, 0.0037]
Demandt−1 -0.0022*** -0.0022***
[-0.0023, -0.0022] [-0.0022, -0.0021]
Nt−1/Kt−2 -0.0362*** -0.0311*** -0.0276***
[-0.0365, -0.0358] [-0.0315, -0.0308] [-0.0279, -0.0274]
Constant 0.0388*** 0.0168*** 0.0257***
[0.0387, 0.0390] [0.0166, 0.0170] [0.0251, 0.0263]
Observations 430,800 430,800 430,800
Adj.R2 0.155 0.125 0.037
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Panel B: The Dynamics of Inventory Adjustment on Model-generated Data
(1) (2) (3)
N Growtht N Growtht. N Growtht
FCt -0.0079*** -0.0072*** 0.0041***
[-0.0079, -0.0080] [-0.0071, -0.0073] [0.0040, 0.0043]
CostShock+t 0.0077*** 0.0077***
[0.0077, 0.0078] [0.0077, 0.0078]
CostShock+t × FC -0.0023*** -0.0025***
[-0.0027, -0.0019] [-0.0025, -0.0024]
CostShock−t 0.0102*** 0.0102***
[0.1020, 0.1020] [0.1020, 0.1020]
CostShock−t × FC 0.0045*** 0.0041***
[0.0037, 0.0053] [0.0040, 0.0042]
CostFavt−1,t−6 0.0017*** 0.0015***
[0.0017, 0.0017] [0.0015, 0.0016]
CostFavt−1,t−6 × FC 0.0042*** 0.0042***
[0.0040, 0.0044] [0.0041, 0.0044]
CostAdvt−1,t−6 -0.0023*** -0.0023***
[-.0..23, -0.0023] [-0.0023, -0.0023]
CostAdvt−1,t−6 × FC -0.0081*** -0.0081***
[-0.0083, -0.0079] [-0.0083, -0.0079]
DemandShock+t 0.0048*** 0.0048***
[0.0048, 0.0048] [0.0048, 0.0048]
DemandShock+t × FC -0.0005*** -0.0008***
[-0.0008, -0.0002] [-0.0010, -0.0005]
DemandShock−t 0.0037*** 0.0037***
[0.0037, 0.0037] [0.0037, 0.0037]
DemandShock−t × FC 0.0006** 0.0004**
[0.0002, 0.0010] [0.0003, 0.0005]
DemandFavt−1,t−6 -0.0055*** -0.0055***
[-0.0055, -0.0055] [-0.0055, -0.0054]
DemandFavt−1,t−6 × FC 0.0008*** 0.0008***
[0.0007, 0.0009] [0.0005, 0.0010]
DemandAdvt−1,t−6 0.0039*** 0.0040***
[0.0039, 0.0039] [0.0039, 0.0040]
DemandAdvt−1,t−6 × FC -0.0011*** -0.0011***
[-0.0012, -0.0009] [-0.0011, -0.0011]
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 430,800 430,800 430,800
Adj.R2 0.178 0.140 0.045
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Table 6: The Asymmetric Response on Actual Data
This table reports the regression results on the asymmetric response of inventory growth to cost shocks using
the real data. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Observations are at annual frequency. Cost shock is
measured by the negative percentage change in Chain-Type Price Indexes for intermediate input by industry
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The dependent variable is N Growth. We use four commonly
used financial constraint classifications: total assets in column (1), ratings in column (2), the Hadlock-Pierce Index
in column (3), and the Whited-Wu Index in column (4). CostShock+t × FCt and CostShock−t × FCt are the
interactions of CostShock+t and CostShock
−
t with the FCt dummy. The regressions also control for (CF/K)t−1,
(CF/K)t−1 × FCt, K Growth and (N/K)t−1, and are estimated with firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects.
t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted using the Huber-White estimator allowing within firm clusters to avoid
potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are
marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht
FC Classification Total Assets Ratings HP Index WW Index
FC 0.0263*** - 0.0118*** -0.0357***
(5.31) - (3.62) (-11.99)
CostShock+t 0.0308*** 0.0502*** 0.0250* 0.0180
(2.80) (4.38) (1.83) (1.33)
CostShock+t × FCt -0.0658*** -0.0493*** -0.0416* -0.0236
(-3.06) (-2.89) (-1.92) (-0.98)
CostShock−t -0.0444*** -0.0335*** -0.0333*** -0.0508***
(-5.24) (-3.79) (-3.72) (-5.55)
CostShock−t × FCt 0.0680*** 0.0242** 0.0334** 0.0960***
(4.25) (1.96) (2.03) (5.28)
(CF/K)t−1 0.145*** 0.130*** 0.152*** 0.130***
(11.61) (13.80) (12.47) (15.79)
(CF/K)t−1 × FCt -0.0258* 0.00312 -0.0394*** -0.0549***
(-1.87) (0.28) (-2.97) (-5.71)
K Growth 0.0628*** 0.0750*** 0.0673*** 0.0550***
(31.16) (43.81) (33.51) (28.45)
Nt−1/Kt−2 -0.0608*** -0.0466*** -0.0644*** -0.0701***
(-9.43) (-9.97) (-10.33) (-11.35)
Constant -0.0109** -0.00624 -0.000360 0.00735
(-2.09) (-1.49) (-0.07) (1.18)
Observations 85429 127120 85637 71115
Adj.R2 0.119 0.138 0.122 0.137
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Table 7: Sales Growth as a Proxy for Cost and Demand Shocks
This table reports the regression results when using quarterly sales growth to proxy for cost and demand shocks.
Variables are defined in Appendix B. Column (1) and (2) examine of quality of sales growth as a proxy for both
types of shocks. The dependent variable is S Growth. Column (3) and (4) test the asymmetric response and
dynamic inventory adjustment in response to sales growth. The dependent variable is N Growth. To test the
asymmetric response, we create a dummy, Advt−1, to capture the extreme adverse (sales) states. It equals to 1 if
S Growtht−1 is below the 20th percentile of the firm’s sales growth distribution, and zero otherwise. To test the
dynamic inventory adjustment, we create two dummies variables, Favt−1,t−6 and Advt−1,t−6, for extreme (sales)
shocks in the previous periods. Favt−1,t−6 (Advt−1,t−6) equals to 1 if the average sales growth over the past 6
periods is in the top (bottom) 20th percentile of the moving-average distribution, and 0 otherwise. The reported
estimates are the cross-simulation average of the coefficients from 100 simulations. 95% confidence intervals are
included in brackets and coefficients are marked with *** if 95% confidence intervals do not span zero.
Sales Growth on Shocks Inventory Growth on Sales Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S Growth S Growth N Growth N Growth
CostShock 0.0264***
[0.0263, 0.0264]




DemandShock × FC 0.0044***
[0.0040, 0.0048]
S Growth+ 0.223*** 0.216***
[0.222, 0.223] [0.215, 0.216]
S Growth+ × FCt -0.154*** -0.144***
[-0.159, -0.149] [-0150, -0.138]
S Growth− 0.332*** 0.333***
[0.331, 0.332] [0.333, 0.334]
S Growth− × FCt 0.111*** 0.118***
[0.110, 0.113] [0.116, 0.120]
Advt−1 0.0028***
[0.0027, 0.0028]








Advt−1,t−6 × FC -0.0113***
[-0.0115, -0.0111]
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 431,400 431,400 430, 800 430,800
Adj.R2 0.186 0.196 0.367 0.372
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Table 8: Input Price Changes at Quarterly Frequency and Instrumented Sales Growth
This table reports the regression results when using quarterly oil price changes (Panel A) and input prices based on the IO table and PPI
(Panel B) to instrument sales growth to test the asymmetric response and dynamic adjustment of inventory growth to cost shocks. We obtain
daily prices of crude oil from Bloomberg and use price on the last trading day in each month to calculate the percentage change in oil prices at
monthly frequency. We then deflate the price changes and compute the cumulative real price changes over three months. The price changes are
matched to the Compustat firms based on the end date of each fiscal quarter and are multiplied by -1 to make positive (negative) price changes
to reflect favorable (unfavorable) cost shocks. We constructed another measure of cost shock at quarterly frequency based on the Input-Output
table and the output price indices at the industry level. For our 71 NAICS industries, the (summary-level use table before redefinitions data in
the 2007) Input-Output table provides the input (supplier) industries from which they use goods and service from and the corresponding flows
between the customer and supplier industries. We calculate the percentage of inputs from each supplier industry’s output to the total inputs
of the customer industry, and use this to weigh the output price indices of the supplier industries, which are based on the Producer Price Index
(PPI) provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and covers all industries in the goods-producing sectors of the U.S. at monthly frequency.
For each product, we compute the percentage change in output prices in each month and average across all products within the industry. We
then adjust for inflation and compound the output price changes to quarterly frequency. To instrument sales growth with our measures of cost
shocks, for each industry, we regress sales growth at quarter t on the (negative of) oil price changes at t − 2 and its interaction with the FC
dummy, controlling for (CF/K)t−1, its interaction with the FC dummy, K Growtht and firm-fixed effect. We lag the oil price changes by two
quarters since on average it takes 2 quarters for the sales growth to react positively to the oil price changes. The control variables are defined
in Appendix B. We use the predicted sales growth to determine whether firms experience favorable or unfavorable cost shocks and perform the
same test as we did on the simulated data in Table 5. For Panel A, we only keep industries for which there is a positive relationship between
sales growth and oil price changes. The results on the asymmetric response are reported in column (1) to (4) and dynamic adjustment in column
(5) to (8). The dependent variable is N Growth. To test the asymmetric response, we create a dummy, Advt−1, to capture the extreme adverse
cost states. It equals to 1 if the predicted sales growth is below the 20th percentile of the firm’s distribution, and zero otherwise. To test the
dynamic inventory adjustment, we create two dummies variables, Favt−1,t−6 and Advt−1,t−6, for extreme cost shocks in the previous periods.
Favt−1,t−6 (Advt−1,t−6) equals to 1 if the average predicted sales growth over the past 6 periods is in the top (bottom) 20th percentile of
the moving-average distribution, and 0 otherwise. The regressions also control for (CF/K)t−1, (CF/K)t−1 × FCt, K Growth and (N/K)t−1,
and are estimated with firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects. We use four commonly used financial constraint classifications: total assets
in column (1) and (5), ratings in column (2) and (6), the Hadlock-Pierce Index in column (3) and (7), and the Whited-Wu Index in column
(4) and (8). The regression model is run for each quarter to account for seasonality. The reported coefficients are the average coefficient over
the four quarters. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using the Fama-MacBeth method. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively. The original regressions on each quarter are available upon request.
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Panel A: Evidence from Oil Price Changes
Asymmetric Response Dynamic Adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht
FC Classification Total Asset Rating HP Index WW Index Total Asset Rating HP Index WW Index
̂S Growth
+
t 0.110** 0.127*** 0.159** 0.092*** 0.099** 0.119*** 0.158** 0.090**
(4.1) (6.26) (3.52) (5.36) (4.05) (6.4) (3.75) (5.65)
̂S Growth
+
t × FCt -0.083** -0.067** -0.173** -0.079*** -0.060* -0.049** -0.162** -0.067*
(-3.67) (-4.97) (-3.79) (-3.44) (-2.93) (-4.16) (-3.93) (-3.17)
̂S Growth
−
t 0.001 -0.028** -0.020*** 0.005 -0.0003 -0.025 -0.021*** 0.006
(0.25) (-4.11) (-7.58) (1.06) (-0.06) (-3.9) (-6.21) (1.24)
̂S Growth
−
t × FCt -0.00357 -0.024 -0.027* -0.038 -0.023** -0.023 -0.021 0.035**
(-0.38) (-1.98) (-2.72) (-3.53) (-3.63) (-1.93) (-2.22) (-3.29)
Advt−1 -0.0006* -0.0013** -0.0004 -0.0003
(-2.83) (-4.17) (-0.93) (-0.55)
Advt−1 × FCt -0.0035*** -0.0025*** -0.0043*** -0.0036**
(-10.35) (-5.05) (-13.4) (-5.68)
Favt−1,t−6 0.0001 0.0011 0.0001 0.0000
(0.21) (2.15) (0.49) (-0.07)
Favt−1,t−6 × FCt 0.0012* 0.0016*** 0.0031*** 0.0017*
(2.67) (6.27) (19.43) (3.07)
Advt−1,t−6 -0.0004 -0.0016** -0.0006 0.0000
(-2.42) (-1.97) (-2.25) (-6.27)
Advt−1,t−6 × FCt -0.0049** -0.0015 -0.0052** -0.0037***
(-5.55) (-2.17) (-5.59) (-7.5)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes. Yes
Observations 48,448 70,065 48,328 37945 48703 70217 48583 38539
Adj.R2 0.299 0.328 0.311 0.320 0.305 0.33 0.316 0.324
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Panel B: Evidence from Inferred Input Price Changes
Asymmetric Response Dynamic Adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht
FC Classification Total Asset Rating HP Index WW Index Total Asset Rating HP Index WW Index
̂S Growth
+
t 0.135*** 0.107** 0.170*** 0.092** 0.125*** 0.097** 0.171*** 0.093***
(7.16) (5.5) (10.0) (4.96) (7.43) (4.89) (11.49) (6.33)
̂S Growth
+
t × FCt -0.135*** -0.089*** -0.213*** -0.131*** -0.133*** -0.072*** -0.206*** -0.121***
(-7.16) (-9.04) (-11.15) (-12.02) (-6.83) (-7.94) (-13.52) (-26.67)
̂S Growth
−
t -0.010 -0.108 -0.033 0.036 -0.010 -0.107 -0.031 0.04
(-0.19) (-2.25) (-0.77) (0.71) (-0.22) (-2.27) (-0.74) (0.87)
̂S Growth
−
t × FCt -0.091 -0.013 -0.069 -0.138 -0.089 -0.016 -0.074 -0.140**
(-1.69) (-0.25) (-1.24) (-3.24) (-1.8) (-0.32) (-1.47) (-3.57)
Advt−1 -0.0004 -0.0013* 0 0.0004
(-1.57) (-2.3) (0.02) (0.81)
Advt−1 × FCt -0.0029** -0.0019*** -0.0042*** -0.0038**
(-5.08) (-4.42) (-8.55) (-4.01)
Favt−1,t−6 -0.0002 0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0001
(-0.46) (1.71) (-0.43) (-0.29)
Favt−1,t−6 × FCt 0.0034*** 0.0023*** 0.0055*** 0.0037***
(6.84) (8.36) (5.77) (8.65)
Advt−1,t−6 0.0003 -0.0017*** 0.0004 0.0009**
(0.6) (-4.21) (0.84) (2.3)
Advt−1,t−6 × FCt -0.0039* -0.0011 -0.0061*** -0.0047***
(-3.04) (-1.42) (-22.51) (-3.84)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes. Yes
Observations 58,559 85,701 58,477 45,841 58879 85884 58777 46595
Adj.R2 0.361 0.39 0.368 0.376 0.364 0.391 0.371 0.379
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Table 9: The Response of Inventory Growth To Credit Shocks
This table reports the response of inventory growth to the shock on firms’ financial constraints status. The sample
consists of all the unrated firms and firms with a below-investment-grade debt rating (BB+ or lower) in the
quarterly Compustat database during the period 1986 to 1993. Panel A reports the impact of the credit shock
on the response of inventory growth of the below-investment-grade firms vis-a-vis that of matched unrated firms.
Panel B explores geographic variation as another source of variation and reports the impact of the credit shock on
the response of inventory growth of firms located in the Northeast region of the United States vis-a-vis that of firms
located elsewhere. The control firms in both tests are matched with the treated firms on industry and size. We use
the 1994 location information obtained from Bill McDonald’s website, which is based on headers for 10-K forms
in 1994 to 2010. The event quarter is 1990Q1. Therefore, the Before window is from 1986Q1 to 1989Q4, and the
After window is from1990Q2 to 1990Q4 (1990Q2 to 1993Q4) for the short-run (long-run) window. We require each
firm contain at least one observation in both the before and after period. We control for the trend before the shock
Preshock, which is a dummy that equals to 1 if the observation is in the three quarters before the shock (1989Q1
to 1989Q3). We partition firms into favorable and unfavorable shock states based on the industry annual input
price change for the three years before the credit shock as well as the three years after. The dependent variable is
N Growtht. All the other variables are defined in Appendix B. The regression model is estimated with firm-fixed
effect. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked
with *, **, and ***, respectively. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses. For the differences, *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels based on one-tail distribution.
Panel A: The Impact on Below-Investment-Grade Firms
Favorable Cost Shocks Unfavorable Cost Shocks
short-run long-run short-run long-run
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht
Aftert 0.00377 0.000395 0.00193 0.00124
(0.56) (0.10) (0.24) (0.32)
Aftert ×BelowInvestment -0.0324** -0.0171* -0.0154 -0.0132*
(-2.39) (-1.87) (-1.43) (-1.95)
Preshockt -0.0126 -0.0104 -0.00862 -0.0101
(0.42) (-0.57) (0.54) (0.72)
Preshockt ×BelowInvestment -0.00646 -0.00455 -0.00244 -0.00234
(-1.56) (-1.39) (-0.85) (-1.07)
log(K)t -0.0821*** -0.0437*** -0.0430** -0.0313**
(-4.38) (-4.26) (-2.63) (-2.30)
Constant 0.569*** 0.312*** 0.291** 0.213**
(4.49) (4.45) (2.66) (2.32)
Observations 1367 2255 511 864
Adj.R2 0.089 0.093 0.019 0.010
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Panel B: Geographic Variation in the Response to Credit Shocks
Favorable Cost Shocks Unfavorable Cost Shocks
short-run long-run short-run long-run
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht N Growtht
Aftert -0.0031 -0.0058** -0.0157*** -0.0056***
(-0.75) (-2.30) (-4.50) (-2.72)
Aftert ×Northeast -0.0123** -0.0045 -0.0006 -0.0052*
(-2.06) (-1.23) (-0.13) (-1.81)
Preshockt 0.0009 -0.00002 -0.0084*** -0.0082***
(0.26) (-0.01) (-2.74) (-2.81)
Preshockt ×Northeast -0.0040 -0.0042 0.0010 0.0004
(-0.75) (-0.81) (0.23) (0.10)
log(K)t -0.0400*** -0.0296*** -0.0330*** -0.0235***
(-10.24) (-11.93) (-9.21) (-11.00)
Constant 0.220*** 0.165*** 0.164*** 0.120***
(10.84) (12.86) (9.75) (11.84)
Observations 5,613 9,306 6,345 10,673
Adj.R2 0.055 0.038 0.016 0.011
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